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BIG BANKS AND BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS 
Megan M. La Belle* and Heidi Mandanis Schooner** 
The banking industry and the patent system are longstanding 
American institutions whose histories date back to the founding of this 
country.  Historically, however, the paths of these two institutions rarely 
crossed.  Although financial firms have been increasing their innovative 
output for decades now, until recently they relied on trade secrecy, first 
mover advantages, and other business mechanisms to protect and monetize 
their intellectual property – not patents. 
Through a convergence of circumstances over the past several years, 
that pattern has changed.  The shift began when the Federal Circuit decided 
that business methods—banks’ primary mode of innovation—are 
patentable subject matter.  That decision triggered an increase in the 
number of business method patents issued by the PTO, and, 
correspondingly, a surge in patent infringement litigation targeting big 
banks.  When the banks found little success in court, their powerful lobby 
persuaded Congress to include a special carve out for financial patents in 
the America Invents Act—the comprehensive patent reform legislation 
enacted in 2011.  Meanwhile, as the financial industry sought legislative 
favor to ward off future infringement suits, many of the big banks built 
substantial patent portfolios of their own. 
This Article explores this nascent relationship and considers some 
potential implications of growing bank involvement in our patent system.  
It suggests that the intersection of these institutions could yield some 
benefit, for example by improving the publicly available information 
regarding financial innovations.  Yet, more pointedly, it warns of possible 
harms, especially if big banks use their political and economic power to 
disproportionately influence patent reform and innovation policy in the 
future. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) 
issued 165 patents to Bank of America, the second largest U.S. bank.  Less 
than a decade earlier, Bank of America’s patent holdings were barely worth 
counting.
1
  While Bank of America was busy becoming a significant patent 
owner, Congress overhauled the U.S. patent system by passing the most 
 
 1. See infra Part V (discussing the patent holdings of Bank of America and other U.S. 
banks). 
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comprehensive legislative reform since 1952.
2
  Twenty years ago, the 
patent system and big banks had little to do with each other.  Today, their 
landscapes are merging through the confluence of various developments 
relevant to innovation in general and financial innovation in particular. 
The foundations of our patent system and the support of innovation 
run deep.  The U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to grant patents to 
inventors to “promote the progress of science and useful arts.”
3
  The patent 
system is designed, therefore, “to foster, not foreclose, innovation.”
4
  Few 
would dispute that a patent system is capable of promoting innovation,
5
 but 
substantial controversy persists over whether our system actually does.  
While patents provide an incentive to innovate by granting the inventor a 
limited monopoly, the benefits of innovation can be outweighed by the 
rent-seeking of the monopolist.  The trick is finding the right balance, and 
for some time now the sentiment has been that the U.S. system needs 
recalibration.
6
 
It seemed that the explosive growth in patent litigation in the early 
2000s, particularly in the high technology sector, could serve as sufficient 
incentive for reform.  Indeed, high tech giants like Microsoft and Google 
led the call for Congress to revamp our patent system.
7
  Yet it has always 
been difficult to pass legislation in the absence of a major crisis.  Perhaps 
the wake of the Great Recession and accompanying urgent need for jobs 
provided the perfect opportunity for Congress to pass patent reform 
legislation.  In signing the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011 
(“AIA”),
8
 President Obama heralded the new law as a means of stimulating 
economic growth.
9
  Substantively, the new law is best known for moving 
 
 2. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284-341 (2011) 
(codified as amended in scattered parts of 35 U.S.C.).   
 3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8. 
 4. CLS Bank Intern. v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 685 F. 3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 5. For a skeptical view of patent systems, see Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, 
The Case Against Patents (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper 2012-035A, 
2012) (arguing that there’s no empirical evidence showing that patents increase innovation 
and productivity). 
 6. See Carl Shapiro, Patent Reform:  Aligning Reward and Contribution (NBER 
Working Paper No. 1314, 2007) (“While there is no doubt that the U.S. economy remains 
highly innovative, and there is no doubt that the patent system taken as a whole plays an 
important role in spurring innovation, the general consensus is that the U.S. patent system is 
out of balance and can be substantially improved.”) (emphasis added). 
 7. See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, Microsoft, Oracle Call for Patent Reform, CNET (Apr. 
25, 2005) http://news.cnet.com/Microsoft,-Oracle-call-for-patent-reform/2100-1030_3-
5683240.html.  
 8. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284-341 (2011) 
(codified as amended in scattered parts of 35 U.S.C.).   
 9. Press Release, President Obama Signs America Invents Act, Overhauling the Patent 
System to Stimulate Economic Growth, and Announces New Steps to Help Entrepreneurs 
Create Jobs, Office of Press Secretary, The White House (SEPTEMBER 16, 2011). 
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the U.S. from a “first-to-invent” to a “first-to-file” regime for patent 
protection.  However, the AIA affects many other reforms that will have 
significant implications for how patents are obtained and enforced in this 
country. 
Alongside these major developments in the patent realm came 
important changes for the financial services industry.  For a long time, the 
conventional wisdom was that financial institutions were uninterested in 
patents and the litigation surrounding patents.  Instead, banks relied on 
other means of protecting their innovations, such as trade secret rights and 
first mover advantages.
10
  But a convergence of events over the past decade 
or so challenged this conventional wisdom, and now patents undoubtedly 
matter to the financial industry. 
To begin, the financial services industry has been engaged in a period 
of high profile innovation in products, processes, and organizations.  In 
fact, some of those innovations have been identified as contributing to the 
Financial Crisis of 2008.
11
  As firms increased innovative output, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”)—the court 
with exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals—opened the door for 
patenting of business methods, the types of inventions most relevant to the 
financial industry.
12
  Although big banks did not patent their inventions 
right away, others did—namely, individual inventors and small entities—
and then they started suing the banks for patent infringement.
13
 
At that point, many financial institutions began seeking patent 
protection for inventions in unprecedented numbers, most likely to ward off 
future infringement suits.
14
  But defensive patenting was insufficient, and 
patent owners continued to target the financial industry with infringement 
suits.  So the big banks turned to Congress and used their unparalleled 
political power to gain favorable treatment in the AIA.  Specifically, the 
bank lobby persuaded Congress to create a unique post-grant administrative 
review procedure that allows financial patents to be challenged at the PTO, 
rather than in expensive, prolonged litigation in federal court.
15
 
 
 10. See infra Part II.A (discussing how the financial industry has traditionally protected 
innovation). 
 11. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED 
STATES (2011) (explaining how some financial innovations may have been a contributing 
factor to the Financial Crisis of 2008). 
 12. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (involving a patent for a data processing system used for financial services).   
 13. See infra Part III (considering recent patent litigation activity against the financial 
industry). 
 14. See infra Part V (detailing the big banks’ expanding patent portfolios). 
 15. See infra Part IV (discussing the bank lobby’s role and agenda in the passage of the 
AIA). 
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That big banks, unlike high tech companies, were able to secure this 
“bailout” under the AIA speaks volumes about the influence of these 
institutions.
16
  In a relatively short time span, financial institutions have 
immersed themselves in the patent world – both as patent owners and 
advocates for reform.  And while the banks’ involvement in the patent 
system may have initially appeared aberrational or fleeting, their 
participation in the most recent round of reform efforts proves that theory 
wrong.
17
  To the contrary, the banks have found a place at the table in the 
patent debate—a topic that merits attention not only because of the banks’ 
political power, but because of their importance to the economy more 
generally.  This Article seeks to shed light on this emerging relationship 
between the financial industry and the patent system. 
This Article proceeds in six parts.  Part I overviews the characteristics 
of financial innovation, exploring briefly what motivates inventors and 
weighing the social costs and benefits of financial innovation.  Part II 
discusses the patentability of financial innovations, focusing on the Federal 
Circuit’s decision in State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., in 
which the court held that business methods are patentable subject matter 
under § 101 of the Patent Act.
18
  This Part explains the State Street court’s 
rationale and considers some early reactions to this controversial decision. 
Part III traces the rapid rise of business method patents—and litigation 
surrounding those patents—in the wake of State Street.  Specifically, it 
canvasses litigation directed at the high tech and financial sectors, and 
addresses how this litigation explosion spurred a call for patent reform.  
Part IV then introduces the AIA and discusses the big banks’ role in this 
legislative reform effort.  This Part gives particular attention to section 18 
of the AIA, pursuant to which Congress established a special post-grant 
review proceeding exclusively for financial business method patents.
19
  It 
also highlights some of the most recent patent reform proposals currently 
pending before Congress. 
Part V turns from the banks’ patent reform activity to their patent 
acquisition activity and examines the current patent holdings of certain 
large financial institutions.  This Part looks not only at the quantity of 
patents that big banks are amassing, but also considers the nature of the 
inventions being patented and the possible reasons why some banks have 
started patenting in substantially greater numbers. 
Finally, Part VI of the Article considers the implications of big banks’ 
 
 16. Paul Michel, Rein in the Big Bank Bail-Out, PATENTLY-O (July 7, 2011), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/07/guest-post-rein-in-the-big-bank-bail-out.html. 
 17. See infra Part IV.C (addressing the most recent set of patent reform proposals). 
 18. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 19. See infra Part IV (describing the recently created administrative review process for 
financial business method patents). 
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participation in our patent system.  We argue that big banks have already 
exercised their political power to influence lawmakers once, and expect 
that they will continue to do so in the future.
20
  Given what little experience 
banks have in the patent arena, and the fundamental differences between 
financial and technological innovation, the banks’ considerable influence 
on innovation policy is cause for concern.  Moreover, potential litigation 
and regulatory implications associated with the banks’ expanding patent 
portfolios suggest that banks should proceed with caution into the 
unchartered territory of financial patents. 
I. CHARACTERISTICS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION 
A. Defining Financial Innovation 
Dictionary definitions of “innovation” focus on something that is 
“new or different.”  Yet, equating innovation with novelty seems overly 
neutral, failing to capture the positive spin that seems associated with 
“innovation.”  In Webster’s unabridged dictionary, the first definition is the 
“introduction of something new” followed by this illustration:  “as the 
driving force in practical economic advance.”
21
  The illustration of the 
definition seems to better capture the implication often associated with 
innovation.  In other words, innovation is not simply something new but is 
progressive. 
“Financial innovation” carries its own particular meaning.  Tufano’s 
definition focuses on newness and widespread adoption: “Broadly 
speaking, financial innovation is the act of creating and then popularizing 
new financial instruments as well as new financial technologies, 
institutions and markets.”
22
  In their survey of empirical studies on financial 
innovation, Frame and White define it as “something new that reduces 
costs, reduces risks, or provides an improved product/service/instrument 
that better satisfies participants’ demands.”
23
  We prefer the second 
definition because it better captures the positive/aspirational nature of 
innovation. 
 
 20. See infra Part VI (discussing the role of big banks in the patent reform debate). 
 21.  WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
UNABRIDGED 1166 (1986) (defining innovation as “1:  the act or an instance of innovating:  
the introduction of something new (~ as the driving force in practical economic advance—
Times Lit. Supp.) 2:  something that deviates from established doctrine or practice . . . 
CHANGE, NOVELTY . . . .”). 
 22. Peter Tufano, Financial Innovation, THE HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF 
FINANCE 4 (Stulz, Lerner, Villalongo, eds., 2002). 
 23. W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J. White, Empirical Studies of Financial Innovation: 
Lots of Talk, Little Action? 3 (2002), available at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-
and-data/events/2002/financial-services-and-payments/papers/frame_white.pdf.   
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Financial innovation can be categorized into groups:  new products or 
services (e.g., structured investments), new processes/procedures (e.g., risk 
management systems), and new organizations (e.g., internet banking).
24
  
While such groupings may be useful in some contexts, innovations can also 
fall into more than one grouping or simply defy categorization.  Because of 
the limitations associated with grouping financial innovations by type, they 
are also sometimes identified by function (e.g., managing risk; price 
discovery; etc.).
25
 
B. Why Innovate? 
Firms innovate for many reasons.  Financial institutions may be 
motivated to innovate to respond to macroeconomic conditions such as 
inflation, interest and exchange rates.  Innovation can breed more 
innovation as growth in new technologies spurs other advances.  Moreover, 
the avoidance of tax and regulatory constraints are among the motivations 
cited prominently.
26
 
Yet, the primary motivators for financial innovation are customer 
demand and firm profits.  In Stefania Fusco’s study of patents on financial 
methods, survey respondents reported that the main incentive for 
innovation “was the need to satisfy clients’ demand and generate profits.”
27
  
 
 24. See id.. For further discussion of different types of innovation, see OECD’s OSLO 
MANUAL:  GUIDELINES FOR COLLECTING AND INTERPRETING INNOVATION DATA 27 (3d ed. 
2005)..   
 25. Merton and Bodie identified six core functions of the financial system:   
To provide ways of clearing and settling payments to facilitate trade.  To 
provide a mechanism for the pooling of resources and for the subdividing of 
shares in various enterprises.  To provide ways to transfer economic resources 
through time, across borders, and among industries. To provide ways of 
managing risk.  To provide price information to help coordinated decentralized 
decision-making in various sectors of the economy.  To provide ways of dealing 
with the incentive problems created when one party to a transaction has 
information that the other party does not or when one party acts as agent for 
another.   
Robert C. Merton and Zvi Bodie, A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing the Financial 
System 2 (1995) available at 
http://www.nek.lu.se/NEKENO/Finance%20B/A%20Framework%20for%20Analyzing%20
the%20Financial%20System.pdf.  The Bank of International Settlements adopted a 
functional approach.  Bank of International Settlements, Recent Innovations in International 
Banking (1986), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/ecsc01a.pdf; see also Tufano, supra 
note 22, at 8. 
 26. For further discussion of conditions that urge financial innovation, see Dionisis Th. 
Philippas & Costas Siriopoulos, Is the Progress of Financial Innovation a Continuous 
Spiral Process?, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS (2011), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1805538.   
 27. Stefania Fusco, The Patentability of Financial Methods:  The Market Participants’ 
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In this way, the incentives for financial innovation are no different from 
other forms of innovation.  Companies innovate in response to competitive 
forces and customer demand.  Today, competition is global and customer 
demand for new products, in particular, is high.
28
  This puts increased 
pressure on firms to not just innovate, but innovate strategically and 
quickly. 
C. Benefits and Costs of Financial Innovation 
On the eve of the Financial Crisis, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben 
Bernanke described the costs and benefits of financial innovation:  
Financial innovation has great benefits for our economy.  The 
goal of regulation should be to preserve those benefits while 
achieving important public policy objectives, including financial 
stability, investor protection, and market integrity.  Although 
financial innovation promotes those objectives in some ways, for 
example by allowing better sharing of risks, certain aspects of 
financial innovation-including the complexity of financial 
instruments and trading strategies, the illiquidity or potential 
illiquidity of certain instruments, and explicit or embedded 
leverage-may pose significant risks.  These risks should not be 
taken lightly.
29
 
As observed by Chairman Bernanke, while innovation yields profits for the 
innovator, it potentially provides benefits to the broader public as well.  
The last several decades have witnessed the development of new financial 
products with potential benefits to many parties.  Securitization
30
 of 
mortgages, for example, provides a mechanism for taking an illiquid asset 
(residential mortgages) and making it liquid (sold as part of a securitized 
pool of mortgages).  Such liquidity enhances the financial stability of the 
mortgage originator.  Furthermore, securitized pools of assets can serve to 
 
Perspectives, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 17 (2011) [hereinafter Fusco, Patentability of 
Financial Methods]. 
 28. See, e.g., Sridhar Balasubramanian, Insight Into Innovation:  Why Companies Must 
Innovate, UNC KENAN-FLAGLER NEWS (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.kenan-
flagler.unc.edu/news/2013/03/why-companies-must-innovate.   
 29. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Regulation 
and Financial Innovation, Speech delivered at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s 2007 
Financial Markets Conference, Sea Island, Georgia (May 15, 2007), transcribed at 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070515a.htm. 
 30. The term “securitization” has many definitions.  The FDIC’s regulations define 
securitization as “the issuance by an issuing entity of obligations for which the investors are 
relying on the cash flow or market value characteristics and the credit quality of transferred 
financial assets (together with any external credit support . . .) to repay the obligations.”  12 
C.F.R. § 360.6(a)(7) (2013).  For a comprehensive discussion of the term, see Jonathan C. 
Lipson, Re:  Defining Securitization, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1229 (2012). 
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lower the cost of credit, making loans available to more diverse borrowers.  
Securitization also offers benefits to investors.  Complex instruments like 
tranched securitizations offer a variety of risk/return depending on investor 
goals.
31
  Similarly, innovative derivative products offer financial benefits to 
many.  Such products allow firms to hedge against all kinds of risks, 
ranging from changes in the price of a commodity to the default of a 
contract counterparty.  Moreover, innovative processes also offer wide-
ranging benefits.  The development of more and more sophisticated risk 
management systems has been seen as essential to the growing 
sophistication of financial products.  In fact, bank regulators have come to 
rely on the effectiveness of firms’ own internal risk management as an 
essential part of the regulatory regime.
32
  Finally, innovative organizations, 
such as internet-only banks,
33
 allow banks to avoid costs associated with 
physical location and provide convenient services to bank customers.  
Other new business structures, such as the special purpose vehicle (“SPV”), 
are essential to the creation of innovative financial products.
34
 
As Chairman Bernanke also observed, however, innovation can be 
costly to society.  New financial products can be costly to consumers 
because the product includes hidden fees or even abusive contract terms.  
Investors can also suffer when complex financial products shroud inherent 
risks.
35
  With regard to derivatives in particular, the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission found that the unregulated over-the-counter derivatives 
market contributed significantly to the Financial Crisis.
36
  Moreover, 
 
 31. See generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, More than Just “New Financial Bingo”:  A 
Risk-Based Approach to Understanding Derivatives, 23 J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (1997) (discussing 
derivatives as risk management tools). 
 32. See generally HEIDI MANDANIS SCHOONER & MICHAEL W. TAYLOR, GLOBAL BANK 
REGULATION:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 171-74 (2010) (discussing the use of internal risk 
management models for purposes of setting regulatory capital requirements); Robert F. 
Weber, An Alternative Story of the Law and Regulation of Risk Management, 15 U. PA. J. 
BUS. L. 1005 (2013) (tracing the history of the regulation of risk management in the banking 
industry). 
 33. Ally Bank, a division of Ally Financial (formerly, GMAC), had no branches or 
physical locations. 
 34. In a securitization, the original owner of the financial assets (e.g., mortgages) 
transfers the title of those assets to a SPV.  The SPV funds its acquisition of those assets by 
issuing its own securities and selling those securities to investors.  For an extensive 
discussion of SPVs and securitization, see Gary B. Gorton & Nicholas S. Souleles, Special 
Purpose Vehicles and Securitization, (Fed. Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper 
No. 05-21, 2005), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.713782.   
 35. For a full discussion of the point in the context of private-label mortgage-backed 
securities, see Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 
GEO. L.J. 1177 (2012).   
 36. THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT xxiv (Jan. 
2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.  The 
FCIC also found mortgage securitization to be a contributing factor in the crisis.  Id. at xxiii. 
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institutions may be overconfident in new processes and take on 
unmanageable risk.  For example, financial institutions and their regulators 
relied heavily on value at risk (“VaR”),
37
 a risk management concept 
originally developed by Banker’s Trust and pioneered by J.P. Morgan.
38
  
The reliance on VaR turned out to be quite problematic in the run up to the 
Financial Crisis since measures of VaR often relied on data from relatively 
short periods of time (e.g., 12 months) and underestimated the impact of 
low probability events (the “fat tails” problem).
39
  Finally, innovative 
organizations can be costly to manage and regulate if existing systems do 
not translate well to the innovative structure. 
II. PATENTABILITY OF FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS 
Innovation suffers if new products and services can be copied quickly 
and inexpensively by competitors.  Appropriability, therefore, becomes an 
important consideration in innovation.
40
  While patent protection may 
provide the appropriate incentive in some industries, such as 
pharmaceuticals, it is not necessarily a good fit for others.  For instance, 
financial innovations have traditionally been protected by means other than 
patents, including trade secrets and first mover advantages.  Paul Glaser, a 
Citigroup executive, once observed about financial innovation: 
When an innovation like mortgage-backed securities appears, 
specialist teams are quickly staffed and equipped at any bank that 
wants to get into the market.  New hardware is deployed and 
software is written to support the instrument within months.  
Compare that to the speed of innovation at General Motors, for 
example.  It will take seven years to bring its Saturn automobile 
to market . . . .
41
 
The speed at which financial innovation occurs was one reason the 
 
 37. VaR is a statistical model used to estimate the maximum amount that a given 
portfolio of financial assets is likely to lose over a specified period of time. 
 38. GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD:  HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P. 
MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE 33-34 
(2009). 
 39. For a detailed discussion of the problems with risk management systems prior to the 
Financial Crisis, see THE TURNER REVIEW:  A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL 
BANKING CRISIS.  FIN. SRVS. AUTH. (Mar. 2009), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf.   
 40. “Appropriability” refers to the mechanisms by which firms seek to recoup their 
investment in innovation.  Robert P. Merges, The Uninvited Guest:  Patents on Wall Street, 
(UC Berkeley Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 126 2003), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=410900.   
 41. Paul F. Glaser, The Intersection of Technology and Financial Services, in 
INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE MARKETS:  A REORDERING OF THE WORLD’S CAPITAL 
MARKET SYSTEMS 13, 18 (Daniel R. Siegel, ed., 1990). 
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industry historically did not rely on patents.  Another was the widely held 
belief that financial innovations and other business methods were simply 
not subject to patent protection. 
A. Protecting Financial Innovation 
Innovation is protected and incentivized in myriad ways.  The United 
States has four primary intellectual property regimes—copyright, 
trademark, patent, and trade secret—and each varies in scope, subject 
matter, and period of protection.
42
  Some of our most economically 
important industries rely heavily on intellectual property rights for success, 
including entertainment, automotive, electronics, semiconductor, and 
pharmaceutical, to name just a few.
43
  How best to safeguard innovation 
will not only depend on the industry, but will also be influenced by the 
nature of the innovative product/process, the innovator’s size and 
resources, and the innovator’s ultimate objectives in seeking intellectual 
property protection. 
To be sure, the use of patents to protect innovative works is much 
more common today than in the past.  The number of patents issued by the 
PTO increased five-fold between 1963 and 2012.
44
  This rapid growth of 
patent activity is attributable to various factors, such as the expanding 
concept of patentable subject matter, the explosion of innovation resulting 
from the digital revolution, and the establishment of the Federal Circuit.
45
 
Yet, in a study of manufacturing firms, Cohen found that “patents are 
still not the major mechanism for appropriating returns to innovations in 
most industries.  Instead, we find that the key appropriability mechanisms 
in most industries are secrecy, lead time and complementary capabilities 
[e.g., sales, marketing, service].”
46
  Historically, these innovation norms 
 
 42. See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 26-27 (Vicki Been et. al. eds., 6th ed. 2012).  
 43. See, e.g., Cecilia H. Gonzalez, Juliana M. Cofrancesco & Nikole R. Salata, The 
Parallel Universes of the US ITC & the District Courts, 10 THE SEDONA CONFERENCE 
JOURNAL 167, 167 (2009) (discussing the increasing importance of intellectual property in 
the U.S. economy and its effects on the USITC and district courts). 
 44. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, U.S. Patent Statistics, Calendar Years 1963-2012, 
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.pdf.   
 45. See Merges, Menell & Lemley, supra note 42, at 127-28 (listing the principal 
modes of legal protection for various types of intellectual work); John R. Allison & 
Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987, 991 
(2003) (noting the increase in patents on internet business methods after the Federal Circuit 
decision in State Street). 
 46. Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their 
Intellectual Assets:  Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent 
(Or Not) 24, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), available at 
http://www.business.otago.ac.nz/econ/courses/econ304/NBER_patent_paper.pdf.  
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carried over to the financial services industry as well.  In examining cross 
border securitizations, for example, Frankel observed that financial 
institutions rarely seek patents to protect the value of their innovations but 
are rewarded in other ways, like reputational gains, tacit knowledge, and 
first mover advantages.
47
  Indeed, at one time, patents were not an apparent 
option for financial institutions because their innovations consisted mostly 
of business methods, which were deemed improper subject matter.
48
  That 
changed in the late 1990s, however, with the Federal Circuit’s decision in 
State Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group.
49
 
B. State Street and the Patentability of Business Methods 
Patentability rests on five essential elements: proper subject matter, 
utility, novelty, non-obviousness, and disclosure.
50
  Although inventions 
must satisfy all of these requirements to be patentable, the proper subject 
matter requirement is of particular importance for financial innovations.  
With regard to subject matter, § 101 of the U.S. Patent Act provides: 
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title.”
51
  The Act further defines a process as “process, 
art or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, 
manufacture, composition of matter, or material.”
52
  Thus, methods clearly 
constitute patentable subject matter, but the Act leaves open the question as 
to whether § 101 encompasses all kinds of methods–including financial 
and other business methods–or whether it is limited to more traditional 
subject matter, such as chemical processes and methods of manufacturing.
53
 
 
 47. Tamar Frankel, Cross-Border Securitizations:  Without Law, But Not Lawless, 8 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 255 (1998); see also TETT, supra note 38, at 20 (“In banking, 
however, patents haven’t traditionally been an option.”); John F. Duffy & John A. Squires, 
Disclosure and Financial Patents:  Revealing the Invisible Hand, 1, 3 (Suomen Pankki 
Bank of Finland & Centre for Econ. Policy Research Conference, Oct. 2010) (“Trade 
secrecy has long been one of the primary, and perhaps even the primary, legal engine by 
which financial firms could keep their innovations proprietary.”) (emphasis in original), 
available at http://www.suomenpankki.fi/en/tutkimus/konferenssit/konferenssit_tyopajat/ 
Documents/CEPR2008/CEPR2008_DuffySquires_paper.pdf.  
 48. See, e.g., In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1994) abrogated by In re 
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that business methods do not constitute 
statutory subject matter). 
 49. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F. 3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
1998), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).   
 50. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (discussing subject matter and utility); §102 (defining novelty); 
§103 (defining non-obviousness); § 112 (defining disclosure). 
 51. 35 U.S.C. §101 (emphasis added). 
 52. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (emphasis added). 
 53. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3239 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating 
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Whether the fast moving advances in the business world are proper 
subject matter for patentability purposes is a question with a long, complex, 
and somewhat inconsistent history.  Several justices of the Supreme Court 
recently explained that “[f]or centuries, it was considered well established 
that a series of steps for conducting business was not, in itself, 
patentable.”
54
  That position is substantiated by a 1908 Second Circuit 
decision in which the court held that a method of bookkeeping “designed to 
prevent frauds and peculation by waiters and cashiers in hotels and 
restaurants” was merely a “system of transacting business” and, thus, not 
patentable subject matter.
55
  Still, other evidence tends to show that 
business methods were in fact patentable in the early years of our nation.  A 
recent study by Michael Risch identifies a number of business method 
patents issued in the nineteenth century.
56
  Indeed, the earliest business 
method patent in the financial services industry dates back to a 1799 
invention titled “Detecting Counterfeit Notes.”
57
 
Further complicating the question of whether business methods are 
patentable is the fact that most modern business methods are embodied in 
computer software.  While a software-embodied business method may 
constitute a “process” under § 101, attempts to patent software often collide 
with the long-established rule that laws of nature, physical phenomena, and 
abstract ideas are not patentable subject matter.
58
  In Gottschalk v. Benson, 
for example, the Supreme Court held that a software program that 
converted binary-coded decimals into pure binary numerals was not 
patentable based on a “natural principles” exception to § 101.
59
  In doing 
so, the Court emphasized that its decision did not preclude the patentability 
of software programs per se.  Rather, the Court found that in this particular 
case the mathematical formula for converting decimals into binary code 
had no practical application outside of its use in computers.  Therefore, 
granting a patent on the software at issue “in practical effect would be a 
patent on the algorithm itself.”
60
 
 
that “the text of § 101 does not on its face convey the scope of patentable processes”). 
 54. Id. at 3232 (Stevens, J. concurring). 
 55. Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467, 467 (2d Cir. 1908). 
 56. Michael Risch, America’s First Patents, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1279, 1320 (2012). 
 57. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, A USPTO White Paper:  Automated Financial 
or Management Data Processing Methods (Business Methods) at 2, available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/busmethp/whitepaper.pdf. 
 58. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3221; Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 
437 U.S. 585 (1978); see also Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness 
and No Closer to the Promise Land:  Bilski’s Superficial Textualism and the Missed 
Opportunity to Return Patent Law to its Technological Moorings, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1289, 
1295-96 (2011) (discussing origins of “natural principles” and their exceptions to patentable 
subject matter).  
 59. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
 60. Id. at 72. 
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Almost a decade later, the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Diehr came 
to a different conclusion and upheld a software patent under § 101.
61
  In 
Diehr, the claimed invention was a computer-implemented process for 
molding uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision products.
62
  
Although the PTO rejected the patent application on the grounds that the 
claims were drawn to nonstatutory subject matter, the Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals (predecessor to the Federal Circuit) reversed.
63
  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the lower court’s decision 
that the invention constituted patentable subject matter.  In support of its 
decision, the Court distinguished the facts of Diehr from those of 
Gottschalk: 
[T]he respondents here do not seek to patent a mathematical 
formula. Instead, they seek patent protection for a process of 
curing synthetic rubber.  Their process admittedly employs a 
well-known mathematical equation, but they do not seek to pre-
empt the use of that equation.  Rather, they seek only to foreclose 
from others the use of that equation in conjunction with all of the 
other steps in their claimed process . . . . Obviously, one does not 
need a “computer” to cure natural or synthetic rubber, but if the 
computer use incorporated in the process patent significantly 
lessens the possibility of “overcuring” or “undercuring,” the 
process as a whole does not thereby become unpatentable subject 
matter.
64
 
The Diehr claims, in other words, did not seek patent protection for a 
mathematical algorithm in the abstract.
65
  Instead, the claims sought 
protection for a software-embodied process that used an algorithm to 
“[perform] a function which the patent laws were designed to protect”–
namely, to transform or reduce an article to a different state or thing.
66
 
Following the decision in Diehr, software patents were often treated as 
“conventional industrial processes that were accomplished using a 
computer, which computer just happened to run software.”
67
  Eventually, 
though, this hide-the-software game came to an end.  In State Street Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Signature Fin.l Grp.,
68
 the Federal Circuit was squarely 
faced with the question of whether a business method embodied in software 
constituted patentable subject matter under § 101. 
 
 61. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
 62. Id. at 177. 
 63. Id. at 179-81. 
 64. Id. at 187 (emphasis added). 
 65. Id. at 192. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Merges, supra note 40, at 3. 
 68. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  The system facilitated partnership (i.e., favorable) 
tax treatment.  In this sense, it is an example of regulatory arbitrage. 
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The invention in State Street was a financial process that calculated 
and allocated costs, expenses, profits, etc. among related mutual funds.
69
  
Like most financial patents, plaintiff Signature’s patent fell within Class 
705 of the PTO’s patent classification system, which is described as “Data 
Processing: Financial Business Practice, Management, or Cost/Price 
Determination.”
70
  At the trial court, defendant State Street moved for 
summary judgment on the ground that the patent was invalid under § 101.  
The district court agreed and granted summary judgment.  Signature 
appealed to the Federal Circuit.
71
 
In a seminal opinion, the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, 
concluding that the patent claims were directed toward statutory subject 
matter.
72
  On its way to this decision, the Federal Circuit grappled with two 
difficult issues:  (1) the patentability of business methods and (2) the 
patentability of software inventions that use mathematical algorithms.  
With respect to the former, the Federal Circuit struck down what the trial 
judge had called the “business methods exception” to patentability.
73
  The 
court explained that this exception was “ill-conceived” because nothing in 
§ 101 suggested that business methods should be treated differently than 
other types of processes.
74
  Business method patents are proper subject 
matter, the court reasoned, as long as they satisfy the other requirements of 
patentability—utility, novelty, non-obviousness, and disclosure—and do 
not fall within the natural principles exception to § 101.
75
 
Turning then to the natural principles exception, the Federal Circuit 
held that the invention at issue in State Street was not a law of nature, 
physical phenomenon, or abstract idea.
76
  As in Diehr, the invention was 
not merely a mathematical algorithm in the abstract, but a process that 
utilized a mathematical algorithm to produce a “useful, concrete and 
tangible result”—namely “a final share price momentarily fixed for 
recording and reporting purposes and even accepted and relied upon by 
regulatory authorities and in subsequent trades.”
77
  Because the software 
 
 69. Id. at 1370. 
 70. Allison & Tiller, supra note 45, at 1025 (referring to PTO’s patent classification 
system—“Data Processing:  Financial Business Practice, Management, or Cost/Price 
Determination.”).  “The PTO created Class 705 in 1997 [(the year before State Street)] from 
the business and cost/price subclasses of Classes 395 and 364.”  Id.  “There are other classes 
of patents that are relevant to financial services.  For example, Class 109 is for safes, bank 
protection or related device; Class 453 is for coin handling; and Class 283 covers printed 
matter including checks and deposit slips.”  Id. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. at 1375-77. 
 74. Id. at 1373, 1375-1377. 
 75.  Id. at 1375-77. 
 76.  Id. at 1375-77. 
 77.  Id. at 1373 (internal quotations omitted). 
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algorithm could be applied in a useful way, the Federal Circuit concluded it 
was proper statutory subject matter under § 101.
78
 
In January 1999, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in State Street, 
allowing the Federal Circuit’s decision to stand.  Shortly thereafter, in 
AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’n, Inc.,
79
 the Federal Circuit was given 
another chance to consider the patentability of business methods.  Relying 
on State Street, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed that business methods were 
not categorically excluded under § 101 and held that the method at issue in 
AT&T—a process for billing telephone calls at different rates depending on 
the long-distance carrier used—was patentable.
80
 
C. Reactions to the State Street Decision 
State Street took many by surprise and triggered strong negative 
reactions from commentators, businesspeople, and legislators alike.  Some 
scholars argued that State Street expanded the concept of patentable subject 
matter in a way that threatened the integrity of our patent system.
81
  Others 
did not object to the patentability of business methods on subject matter 
grounds, but instead worried that the PTO would improperly grant business 
method patents for inventions that lacked novelty or were obvious because 
of inadequate written prior art in the field.
82
 
Yet, it was corporate America’s outcry about business method patents 
that garnered real attention, most importantly from Congress.  The business 
world was convinced that State Street would wreak havoc on industry 
(particularly financial services) by embroiling companies in frivolous 
lawsuits over patents that never should have been issued in the first place.
83
  
 
 78.  Id.  
 79.  172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 80.  Id. at 1357-58. 
 81.  See, e.g., Alan L. Durham, “Useful Arts” in the Information Age, 1999 BYU L. 
REV. 1419, 1526-28 (1999) (exploring State Street’s aftermath and predicting an increase in 
patents on “non-technological” innovations”); John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal 
Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139 (1999) [hereinafter, Thomas, Liberal Professions] 
(discussing how State Street presents the latest in a series of cases testing the boundaries of 
the “useful arts”). 
 82.  See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for 
Business?, 16 Santa Clara COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 268-69 (2000) (arguing that 
the standards for novelty and obviousness are not absolute and will be adjusted for business 
method patents); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Analyze This:  A Law and Economics Agenda for 
the Patent System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2081, 2090 (2000) (explaining that for areas like 
business methods which were traditionally thought of as ineligible for patent protection, 
patent examiners have few sources of prior art).   
 83. See, e.g., Robert M. Kunstadt, Opening Pandora’s Box, THE RECORDER, Jan. 1999, 
at 29 available at LEXIS (predicting a “large-scale disruption of U.S. commerce, as sharp 
operators move to patent business methods and assert patents against the unsuspecting”); 
Josh McHugh, Barbed Wire on the Internet, FORBES, May 17, 1999, at 183 (stating that 
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While some deemed this reaction “hysterical,”
84
 Congress responded in 
record time by enacting the First Inventor Defense Act of 1999 to stem the 
impact of State Street.  Congress did not reverse the Federal Circuit’s 
holding that business methods constitute patentable subject matter under § 
101, but rather created an infringement defense for an inventor of a 
business method that was later patented by another.
85
  The Act, sponsored 
by Senator Schumer of New York, provided for a stop-gap measure that 
protected alleged infringers from suit as long as they (i) reduced the 
business method to practice at least one year before the effective filing date 
of the patent, and (ii) commercially used the method before the effective 
filing date.
86
  In other words, Congress established “prior user rights” for 
business method patents. 
Like Congress, the PTO also took steps to mitigate the impact of State 
Street.  In 2000, the agency launched various initiatives and instituted new 
examination procedures to enhance the quality of business method 
patents.
87
  First, the PTO planned to hire and specially train additional 
examiners who were qualified to review business method/Class 705 
applications.
88
  Second, the PTO established industry outreach programs to 
encourage dialogue about business method patents and expand the PTO’s 
prior art database for better searching.
89
  Finally, the PTO put in place 
various quality control mechanisms for business method patents, including 
a second level—or “second pair of eyes”—review of Class 705 
applications.
90
 
 
patents may become “the barbed wire of the Internet”); Jaret Seidberg, Ruling Threatens 
Banks With Patent Lawsuits, AM. BANKER, Sept. 2, 1998, at 3 (positing that State Street will 
bring hundreds of patent infringement suits to the financial services industry). 
 84. See Carol B. Oberdorfer, “Boom” in Business Method Patent Filings Has Followed 
State Street Ruling, PTO Says, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPR. J. (BNA), Dec. 10, 1998, at 115 
(discussing the reactions of banks and businesses affected by the State Street ruling). 
 85. PUB. L. NO. 106-113, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A-555.  In 2000 and 2001, 
additional bills addressing business method patents were introduced in Congress, but failed 
to gain traction.  Allison & Tiller, supra note 45, at 1021-24.  
 86. PUB. L. NO. 106-113, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A-555; 145 CONG. REC. 
S14,836 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1999) (statement of Sen. Schumer) (justifying the prior user 
defense as providing certainty for the financial services industry in “the face of uncertainty 
presented by the Federal Circuit’s decision in the State Street case”).  Of course, this 
commercial use had to be “secret” or else otherwise it would constitute invalidating prior art 
against the patented invention. 
 87. USPTO White Paper, supra note 57, at 1.   
 88. Id. at 9-10. 
 89. Id. at 22; Business Method Patents:  Hearings on H.R. 1332 Before the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. On Courts, the Internet & Intell. Prop., 107th Cong. 48 
(2001) (statement of Nicholas P. Godici, Acting Under Secretary of Commerce for 
Intellectual Property and Acting Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office). 
 90. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Patent Quality Improvement:  Expansion of the 
Second-Pair-of-Eyes Review, 
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Though these congressional and administrative measures assuaged 
some immediate concerns over State Street, the debate over business 
method patents persisted.
91
  In the years following the Federal Circuit’s 
decision, the number of business method patents granted by the PTO 
steadily rose, and critics continued to question the wisdom and legality of 
this practice.
92
  Moreover, as predicted in the wake of State Street, this 
increase in business method patents brought with it a proliferation of 
infringement litigation—ultimately leading to renewed calls for reform. 
III. BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS FROM STATE STREET TO BILSKI 
State Street naturally caused alarm for the banking world since the 
case involved financial institutions and financial products.
93
  But the 
decision affected a number of other industries as well, particularly the 
emerging high tech sector.  To be sure, State Street was decided at the 
height of the dot-com era when a slew of new business methods on 
purchasing, advertising, and other Internet-related activities were 
introduced.
94
  With this convergence of circumstances, it is no small 
wonder that the past decade or so has witnessed an explosion of business 
method patents and litigation surrounding these patents. 
A. The Rise of Business Method Patents 
State Street sparked a significant uptick in applications for business 
method patents, and, at least initially, the number of Class 705 patents 
granted by the PTO correspondingly rose.
95
  Before State Street, the most 
 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/action/q3p17a.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 
2013); see also USPTO White Paper, supra note 57, at 21 (discussing the recommendation 
to expand the two-tiered review). 
 91. See Allison & Tiller, supra note 45, at 1007-17 (illuminating the ongoing debate in 
the wake of State Street). 
 92. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Starling D. Hunter, On the Feasibility of Improving 
Patent Quality One Technology at a Time:  The Case of Business Methods, 21 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 729, 730-31 (2006).   
 93. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing the financial industry’s 
reaction to State Street). 
 94. See Thomas, Liberal Professions, supra note 81, at 1140 (providing that following 
State Street, applicants “besieged the Patent Office with applications” [for] Internet-based 
business models” and other software.). 
 95. See id. (discussing how applicants seized upon State Street to seek patents for 
applications including financial software and Internet-based business models); Allison & 
Tiller, supra note 45, at 991 (explaining that software-embodied patents had been issued 
before State Street, but that number grew significantly after the decision); Carol B. 
Oberdorfer, Patents:  “Boom” in Business Method Patent Filings Has Following State 
Street Ruling, PTO Says, Trademark & Copyright Daily (BNA), No. 57, at 115 (Dec. 10, 
1998) (explaining that the PTO expected 300 business method-related patents in the first 
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Class 705 patents granted in a year since 1992 was 249; that number 
increased to 489 in 1998, 720 in 1999, and 736 in 2000.
96
  Between 2001 
and 2004, however, there was a marked decline in issued business method 
patents compared to the previous three years,
97
 most likely resulting from 
the PTO’s heightened examination procedures for these types of 
inventions.
98
  That trend began to reverse itself in 2005 when the PTO 
granted 776 business method patents; by 2009, that number had grown to 
just shy of 2000.
99
 
Although we know that Class 705/business method patents have 
increased since State Street, it is difficult to ascertain which of these patents 
support financial products.  That difficulty stems, at least in part, from the 
lack of consensus on a definition for financial products.
100
  Still, a few 
scholars have undertaken empirical studies to collect more precise data on 
financial patenting, for example by eliminating certain subclasses of 705 
patents or using key word searches to capture patents that were improperly 
classified.
101
  Despite using different methodologies, each of these 
empirical studies reaches the same conclusion:  the number of financial 
patents has steadily risen. 
Yet, it is important to bear in mind that financial patents are only one 
subset of business methods patents issued by the PTO.
102
  Indeed, one study 
 
year following  State Street). 
 96. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Patent Statistics, Patent Counts by Class 
by Year Report, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cbcby.pdf 
(last modified April 2, 2013).   
 97. See id. (detailing that in the years 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004, there were 485, 458, 
444, and 323 Class 705 patents granted, respectively.).  
 98. See supra notes 87-90 (discussing additional measures taken by the PTO with 
respect to business method patents).  In 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004, there were 485, 458, 
444, and 323 Class 705 patents granted, respectively. 
 99. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Patent Statistics, Patent Counts by Class 
by Year Report, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cbcby.pdf 
(last modified April 2, 2013).   
 100. See, e.g., Josh Lerner, The Litigation of Financial Innovations, 53 J.L. & ECON. 807, 
810 n.3 (2010) [hereinafter Lerner, Financial Innovations] (noting that “financial patents” 
could encompass innovations stemming from “banking, investing, payment systems, 
securities issuances, and trading”). 
 101. See Stefania Fusco, Is the Use of Patents Promoting the Creation of New Types of 
Securities?, 25 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 243, 263-64 (2009) (analyzing 
patents based on dividing financial securities into macro-categories); Robert M. Hunt, 
Business Method Patents and U.S. Financial Services, 1 (Feb. 2009), Supercedes Working 
Paper No. 07-21, available at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-
data/publications/working-papers/2008/wp08-10.pdf; Josh Lerner, Where Does State Street 
Lead?  A First Look at Finance Patents, 1971-2000, 5-7 (HBS FINANCE WORKING PAPER 
NO. 01-005, May 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=224895 (analyzing financial 
formula and method patents); Josh Lerner, The Two-Edged Sword:  The Competitive 
Implications of Financial Patents (2003) (on file with author).   
 102. Hunt, supra note 101, at 4. 
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estimates that less than one-tenth of all Class 705 patents are assigned to 
banks and other financial firms,
103
 while the majority are issued to 
companies in the high tech sector like IBM, Microsoft, and Amazon.
104
  In 
2012, for example, the PTO granted IBM, Microsoft, and Amazon 262, 87, 
and 103 Class 705 patents, respectively.
105
  To be sure, it was the litigation 
over these high tech business method patents, especially Amazon’s “one-
click” patent, that helped spur the outcry for reform. 
B. Business Method Patent Litigation 
It should come as no surprise that the number of patent suits filed in 
federal court has increased as the PTO has issued more patents.
106
  In the 
past twenty-odd years, however, the rise in patent litigation has outpaced 
the increase in patent grants.
107
  In fact, patent litigation is rising at a faster 
rate than any other type of civil litigation.
108
  While there is no single cause 
of this surge in patent litigation, allowing patents on business methods has 
been a contributing factor. 
Recent studies demonstrate that business method patents are indeed 
litigated at a significantly greater rate than other types of patents.
109
  
 
 103. Id.  
 104. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Statistics, Class 705, DP:  Financial, 
Business Practice, Management, or Cost/Price Determination (Data Processing) 1969-2012, 
Extended Year Set – Patenting in Technology Classes, Breakout by Organization,  available 
at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/tecasga/705_torg.htm [hereinafter 
USPTO Statistics, Class 705, Breakout by Organization] (identifying the above mentioned 
companies as being among the top ten receivers of such patents from 1969-2012).   
 105. Id. 
 106. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Statistics, Calendar Years 1963-2011, 
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.pdf.   
 107. Compare James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, PATENT FAILURE:  HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 127 (Princeton Univ. Press 2008) 
(stating that ten times more patent suits were filed in U.S. federal courts in 2006 than in 
1990) with U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, U.S. Patent Statistics, Calendar Years 1963-
2011, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.pdf. 
(demonstrating that 2.5 times more patents were issued by the USPTO in 2006 than 1990). 
 108. Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, F. Scott Kieff, Lawrence Sung & Thomas Woolston, 
The New Private Ordering of Intellectual Property:  The Emergence of Contracts as the 
Drivers of Intellectual Property Rights, 4 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 5, 57 n.69 (2009); Lerner, 
Financial Innovations, supra note 100, at 818.  
 109. See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 107, at 213-14 (detailing how software patents 
are different than other patents as they are “particularly prone to litigation and to disputes 
over patent boundaries . . . .”); John R. Allison, Emerson H. Tiller & Samanth Zyontz, 
Patent Litigation and the Internet, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2012) (finding that 
Internet patents are between 7.5 and 9.5 times more likely to end up in infringement 
litigation); Lerner, Financial Innovations, supra note 100, at 818-19 (describing how the 
litigation rate for the most litigated technology group (drug and health) is still 7% less than 
the rate for financial patents).  
2014] BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS 451 
 
Several theories may explain this phenomenon.  For one, business method 
patents tend to have “unclear boundaries” that make infringement claims 
easier to assert against a broader group of potential defendants.
110
  Another 
possibility is that alleged infringers may be less willing to license and more 
willing to litigate business method patents because of questions 
surrounding their validity.  Perhaps, instead, business method patents are 
litigated at higher rates because they are frequently owned by patent 
assertion entities (“PAEs”) rather than by competitors.
111
  Whatever the 
reason, the fact remains that business method patents end up in court more 
often than other types of patents. 
Since State Street, business method patent litigation has spread 
throughout the country.  These suits have been filed in a number of 
different jurisdictions and involve a variety of inventions and litigants.
112
  
This Article highlights just a few of these litigation stories with a focus on 
high profile cases involving high tech and financial business method 
patents. 
C. High Tech Business Method Patent Litigation 
The list of patent suits involving high tech companies and high tech 
business methods is long.
113
  Yet a couple of these cases are worth 
mentioning because of their impact on the patent reform effort.  In the 2001 
“one-click patent” litigation, Amazon sued Barnes and Noble (“B&N”) for 
infringing U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411, which claimed a method of online 
shopping.
114
  The district court granted a preliminary injunction and 
required B&N to remove from its website a competing streamlined 
purchasing feature.
115
  The decision drew sharp criticism from members of 
the high tech community and scholars who were convinced that the PTO 
 
 110. Id. at 187; Allison, Tiller & Zyontz, supra note 109, at 5. 
 111. See infra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing patent assertion entities).   
 112. See Lerner, Financial Innovation, supra note 100, at 809-17; Allison, Tiller & 
Zyontz, supra note 109, at 39-82; Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings:  
Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1600 
(2009) [hereinafter Chien, Of Trolls] (describing how patent litigation is brought by entities 
ranging from private and public corporations to nonprofits). 
 113. See e.g., Chien, Of Trolls, supra note 112, at 1573-77 (mentioning the high profile 
patent suits involving Qualcomm and Broadcom). 
 114. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F.Supp.2d 1228 (W.D. Wash. 
1999); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet at 20:  Evolution of a Constitution for Cyberspace, 
20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1115, 1138 (2012) (“The one-click method reduced the 
number of steps a consumer must take to order an item from an e-commerce site, and 
relieved a consumer from having to reenter all of his basic information, such as name, 
address, and credit card information.”). 
 115. Amazon.com, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 1249; John R. Thomas, Liberty and Property in the 
Patent Law, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 569, 577 (2002) [hereinafter, Thomas, Liberty and Property]. 
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never should have granted the patent in the first place.
116
  Some argued that 
business methods should not constitute patentable subject matter, while 
others claimed that such patents should have been rejected on novelty or 
obviousness grounds.
117
  Ultimately, the Federal Circuit vacated the 
preliminary injunction, and the parties settled the dispute.
118
  Nevertheless, 
the “one-click” patent litigation became the poster child for everything 
wrong with our patent system. 
Though Amazon v. Barnes & Noble is probably the most notorious 
business method patent suit, others have garnered significant attention too.  
Since the late 1990s, for example, Walker Digital  has filed a series of 
lawsuits against technology companies like Microsoft, Google, Facebook, 
Amazon, Yahoo, and others for patent infringement.
119
  While defendants 
have won a few of these cases on the merits,
120
 the vast majority of such 
cases end in settlements totaling tens of millions of dollars.
121
  According to 
its website, Walker Digital is a “privately held research and development 
lab” led by Jay Walker, the co–founder of Priceline.com and owner of 
hundreds of patents—most famously the reverse auction patent.
122
  In 1999, 
Forbes spotlighted Mr. Walker in an article, suggesting he is “an Edison 
for a new age.”
123
  In addition, Time magazine twice named Walker as one 
 
 116. See Peter R. Lando, Business Method Patents:  Update Post State Street, 9 TEX. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 403, 404-05 (2001) (explaining critics’ belief that the PTO mistakenly 
issued many business method patents because the Office was overworked, understaffed, and 
used search databases that were antiquated and ill-suited  for  such patent applications).   
 117. See, e.g., id.; Margo A. Bagley, Internet Business Model Patents:  Obvious by 
Analogy, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253, 260-1 (2001) (arguing that business 
method patents often resemble what are normally considered un-patentable “ideas”). 
 118. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 
2001); Thomas, Liberty and Property, supra note 115, at 577. 
 119. See, e.g., Robert M. Hunt, You Can Patent That?, PHILA. FED. RESERVE BANK BUS. 
REVIEW 2001(Q1):  5-15, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/intelproperty 
comments/youcanpatentthat.pdf (explaining Walker Digital’s decision to sue Microsoft’s 
Expedia Travel Service for infringing its patent on  Priceline.com’s “reverse auction” 
process); John Letzing, Founder of Priceline Spoiling for a Fight Over Tech Patents, THE 
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 22, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904070604576516211224146034.html 
(explaining that Walker Digital has filed 30 patent infringement lawsuits aimed at hundreds 
of companies).   
 120. See Walker Digital, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2011-1419 (Fed Cir. 2012) 
(upholding summary judgment of non-infringement in favor of Microsoft). 
 121. See, e.g., Josh Lowensohn, Report:  Apple, Groupon Settle Walker Digital IP Suits, 
CNET.COM (July 22, 2011), http://news.cnet.com/8301-27076_3-20082292-248/report-
apple-groupon-settle-walker-digital-ip-suits/ (reporting that the settlement topped $25 
million). 
 122. About Us:  The Company, WALKER DIGITAL WEBSITE (2011), 
http://www.walkerdigital.com/about-us_the-company.html.   
 123. Dylan Machan, An Edison for a New Age?, Forbes (May 17, 1999), available at 
http://www.forbes.com/global/1999/0517/0210020a.html.   
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of the  “50 most influential business leaders of the digital age.”
124
 
Yet, in the eyes of many, Walker Digital and companies like it are 
nothing more than unscrupulous patent trolls who thwart innovation by 
forcing defendants to divert resources from research and development to 
litigation.
125
  So, beginning in the early 2000s, Microsoft, Oracle, and other 
high tech leaders called for patent reform.
126
  These companies pushed hard 
for an overhaul of the patent system,
127
 and Congress responded by 
introducing the first patent reform bill in 2005.
128
  Although it would take 
another six years for Congress to pass the AIA (as discussed later in the 
Article), these early efforts by the high tech industry undoubtedly played a 
key role in patent reform. 
D. Financial Business Method Patent Litigation 
Federal courts have also witnessed a spike in litigation involving 
financial business method patents.  In fact, empirical evidence shows that 
within the category of business methods, patents related to financial 
innovations are especially likely to become the subject of a lawsuit.
129
  
Thus, for the past decade, many financial institutions with little prior patent 
experience have found themselves in court facing infringement charges, 
injunctions, and steep damage awards.
130
 
One early chapter of this litigation story involved eSpeed, the 
electronic bond-trading subsidiary of Cantor Fitzgerald LP.
131
  Around the 
late 1990s, eSpeed started building its portfolio of business method patents 
 
 124. About Us:  The Company, supra note 122 (internal quotations omitted).   
 125. See Martin Campbell-Kelly, Not All Bad:  An Historical Perspective on Software 
Patents, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 191, 200-01 (2005) (describing hostility 
towards entities that obtain and enforce low quality patents); Letzing, supra note 119 
(discussing concerns that the spike in patent litigation will have a chilling effect on 
innovation). 
 126. McCullagh, supra note 7; Interview with Brad Smith, Senior Vice President, 
General Counsel and Corporate Secretary, Microsoft Corporation, in Washington, D.C. 
(Mar. 10, 2005), available at http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/news/features/2005/ 
mar05/03-10patentreform.aspx.  
 127. Chien, Of Trolls, supra note 112, at 1576; Coalition for Patent Fairness Website, 
available at http://www.patentfairness.org/learn/why/.   
 128. Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2005-06).  
 129. Lerner, Financial Innovation, supra note 100, at 827 (finding that financial patents 
are litigated two to three dozen times more frequently than patents as a whole). 
 130. See id. at 807, 826 (concluding that financial firms are especially likely to be 
targeted and named as defendants in patent litigation actions.). 
 131. Marius Meland, eSpeed Seeks Up to $64M in Patent Suit Over Bond Trading 
System, Law 360 (May 27, 2004), available at 
http://www.law360.com/articles/1523/espeed-seeks-up-to-64m-in-patent-suit-over-bond-
trading-system.   
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related to electronic trading of futures and other commodities.
132
  Lawsuits 
against several exchanges and other financial entities ensued, with many of 
the early cases ending in lucrative settlements for eSpeed.
133
  Litigation 
involving just one eSpeed patent, for instance, resulted in approximately 
$50 million in revenue from settlement.
134
  These high payouts not only 
spurred eSpeed to file additional infringement actions, but also inspired 
competitors to pursue patent litigation of their own.
135
 
While eSpeed sustained a widespread litigation campaign, it does not 
compare to DataTreasury.  DataTreasury, a company founded by inventor 
Claudio Ballard, has sued more than seventy financial services firms for 
infringing its check-processing patents.
136
  DataTreasury has litigated 
against major financial institutions like Bank of America, Citibank, J.P. 
Morgan, and Wells Fargo, all of which have settled and agreed to pay hefty 
licensing fees.
137
  The one bank that proceeded to trial, U.S. Bancorp, 
suffered a huge loss when the patents were upheld and DataTreasury was 
awarded more than $50 million in damages.
138
  After filing an appeal, U.S. 
Bancorp ended up settling as well.
139
  To date, DataTreasury has collected 
an estimated $400 million in settlement/licensing fees since it began 
enforcing its patents just over a decade ago.
140
 
 
 132. Phillipa Leighton-Jones, Chicago Exchanges Settle Patent Litigation with eSpeed, 
FINANCIAL NEWS (Aug. 27, 2002), http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2002-08-
27/chicago-exchanges-settle-patent-litigation-with-espeed.   
 133. Id.; Jonathan M. Barnett, Property as Process:  How Innovation Markets Select 
Innovation Regimes, 199 YALE L.J. 384, 419 (2009); Marius Meland, eSpeed, Nymex Settle 
Patent Dispute Over Trading Technology, LAW 360 (Dec. 23, 2003), available at 
http://www.law360.com/articles/665/espeed-nymex-settle-patent-dispute-over-trading-
technology; Press Release, eSpeed and New York Mercantile Exchange Reach Settlement 
Agreement on Wagner Patent (Dec. 22, 2003), available at 
http://www.espeed.com/articles/article20031222.htm. 
 134. Meland, supra note 133, at 1. 
 135. See, e.g., Marius Meland, Competition:  Incentive to Protect Proprietary Business 
Methods, LAW 360 (Jan. 31, 2006), available at 
http://www.law360.com/articles/5169/competition-incentive-to-protect-proprietary-
business-methods (describing how companies, such as Trading Technologies International 
Inc., have sued on similar patent infringement grounds).   
 136. Barnett, supra note 133, at 419; Jan Wolfe, Herrick, Weil Knock Out investor’s Suit 
Against DataTreasury, AM LAW LITIGATION DAILY (May 14, 2013), available at 
http://www.americanlawyer.com/digestTAL.jsp?id=1202600128424&Herrick_Weil_Knock
_Out_Investors_Suit_Against_DataTreasury&slreturn=20130514000239.   
 137. Id. 
 138. Jackie Stewart, DataTreasury, U.S. Bancorp Settles Image-Capture Patent Dispute, 
AM. BANKER (Dec. 27, 2011), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/176_249/datatreasury-us-bancorp-item-capture-
patent-1045195-1.html.   
 139. Id. 
 140. Robert Sterne, et al., America Invents Act:  The 5 New Post-Issuance Procedures, 
13 SEDONA CONF. J. 27 (2012). 
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Calling DataTreasury a thorn in the side of the financial industry is 
putting it mildly.  When attempts to knock out DataTreasury’s patents in 
court failed,
141
 banks looked for other ways to eliminate the threat.  They 
initially turned to the PTO, but DataTreasury’s patents survived 
reexamination.
142
  The banks then sought relief from Congress, lobbying 
Senators Schumer, Sessions, and others for a legislative solution.
143
  The 
2007 and 2009 versions of the patent reform bill included provisions 
preventing DataTreasury from collecting patent infringement damages 
from banks.
144
  This approach was problematic, however, because it 
arguably constituted a taking of private property that would require the 
government to compensate DataTreasury.
145
  Meanwhile, as the banks and 
their congressional allies searched for alternative solutions, the courts were 
taking a hard look at business method patents too. 
E. Bilski 
Questions about business method patents persisted after State Street.  
It was one thing for the Federal Circuit to say that business methods 
constitute patentable subject matter,
146
 but another to establish criteria by 
which the patentability of those inventions could be assessed.  In a series of 
cases since State Street, the courts have addressed § 101 patent eligibility 
for diverse technologies, including transitory signals,
147
 diagnostic 
methods,
148
 isolated DNA sequences,
149
 and, most pertinent to this Article, 
methods of doing business.
150
 
 
 141. Stewart, supra note 138.   
 142. Sterne, supra note 140, at 27. 
 143. See Barnett, supra note 133, at 425 (lobbying for relaxed legislation on patent 
restrictions); Letter from the Coalition of Patent Fairness to The Honorable Harry Reid, 
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, and The Honorable Mitch McConnell, Republican Leader, 
U.S. Senate, Jan. 22, 2008, http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=249 (urging Congress 
to pass patent reform legislation in order to promote innovation, growth, and balance in the 
patent system).  
 144. Barnett, supra note 133, at n.92; Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Lawmakers Move to Grant 
Banks Immunity Against Patent Lawsuit, WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2008), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/02/13/AR2008021303731_pf.html.   
 145. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Birnbaum, supra note 144, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/13/ 
AR2008021303731_pf.html.   
 146. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F. 3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
1998).   
 147. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 148. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
 149. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).   
 150. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (2010); In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 
2007). 
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The first of the business method cases was In re Comiskey, which 
concerned a patent application directed toward a method for conducting 
mandatory arbitration.
151
  In that case, the PTO rejected Comiskey’s 
application as obvious and the Federal Circuit affirmed, but on different 
grounds.  Specifically, the court held that Comiskey’s claims failed to 
satisfy § 101 because they were merely mental processes untied to a 
machine or other class of statutory subject matter; in short, the claims were 
simply abstract ideas.
152
  The Federal Circuit’s decision to rely on § 101, 
rather than § 103, was notable because it signaled to the patent community 
a reigning in of the broad “useful, concrete, and tangible result” test 
announced a decade earlier in State Street.
153
 
This trend away from State Street and toward a more demanding § 
101 analysis continued in In re Bilski.  Bilski involved a financial 
innovation that provided a method for hedging risk in commodities 
trades.
154
  The PTO rejected Bilski’s application under § 101, inter alia, 
because the invention was not implemented on a specific apparatus.
155
  
Although Bilski’s appeal was originally heard by a panel of the Federal 
Circuit, the court sua sponte ordered en banc review before the panel 
issued its decision.
156
  The en banc court ultimately affirmed the PTO’s 
rejection, yet the decision was highly fractured with a majority opinion, a 
concurrence, and three separate dissents. 
As an initial matter, the majority reaffirmed the holding of State Street 
that business methods are not categorically excluded from § 101.
157
  Aside 
from that, however, State Street’s precedential control came to an end as 
the majority proceeded to overrule the “useful, concrete or tangible results” 
test.
158
  In its place, the court adopted the “machine-or-transformation” test, 
which provides that a business method is patentable if it (1) is tied to a 
specific machine or (2) transforms an article into a different state or 
thing.
159
  Applying this new test, the majority held that Bilski’s method was 
not statutory subject matter and therefore affirmed the PTO’s rejection.
160
 
When the Supreme Court granted Bilski’s petition for certiorari, many 
believed that sounded the death knell for business method patents.  The 
Court heard oral arguments in November 2009 but did not issue its decision 
 
 151. Id.  The court explicitly stated that it considered Comiskey’s application as a 
business method patent.  Id. at 1374. 
 152. Id. at 1376-78. 
 153. State Street, 149 F. 3d at 1373. 
 154. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3223 (2010). 
 155. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 156. Id. at 949. 
 157. Id. at 960. 
 158. Id. at 960 n.19. 
 159. Id. at 959-60. 
 160. Id. at 964. 
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until the end of the term in June 2010.
161
  This unusually long delay caused 
some commentators to suggest that the Court was contemplating something 
ambitious, such as a complete bar of business method patents under § 
101.
162
  Others predicted that Justice Stevens, who was retiring that year 
and had consistently taken a narrow view of patent rights, was authoring 
the opinion.
163
  Briefly heartened by these predictions, opponents of 
business method patents were disappointed when they proved to be wrong. 
The Supreme Court issued its decision in Bilski on the last day of the 
2010 term.  Contrary to expectations, Justice Kennedy authored the 
majority opinion joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Scalia and the Chief 
Justice.
164
  Justice Stevens did in fact write an opinion, but it was a 
concurrence in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined.  
What all the justices agreed upon was the holding:  Bilski’s method for 
hedging risk was not patentable subject matter.
165
  They disagreed, though, 
on the rationale.  The majority reasoned that business methods are not 
categorically excluded under § 101, but that this particular method could 
not be patented because it was merely an abstract idea.
166
  The majority 
further explained that the Federal Circuit’s machine-or-transformation test 
was not the sole means of proving proper subject matter.
167
  Instead of 
using bright-line tests, the Court said, compliance with § 101 should be 
assessed on a situational basis. 
Justice Stevens, on the other hand, argued that business methods are 
 
 161. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at3231. 
 162. See, e.g., Tom Goldstein Predicts the Outcomes (and the Authors) of the Final Four 
Supreme Court Cases of this Term, ALTHOUSE (June 27, 2010), 
http://althouse.blogspot.com/2010/06/tom-goldstein-predicts-outcomes-and.html; Gerard 
Magliocca, Where is Bilski?, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Apr. 5, 2010), 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/04/where-is-bilski.html.   
 163. Josh Blackman, Who Will Write Bilski?, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (June 23, 2010), 
http://joshblackman.com/blog/2010/06/23/who-will-write-bilski-black-pcaob-mcdonald-cls-
and-doe-my-final-predictions/; Goldstein, supra note 162; Joe Miller, Comment to Where is 
Bilski?, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Apr. 5, 2010), 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/04/where-is-bilski.html. 
 164. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223 (2010). 
 165. Id. at 3221. 
 166. Id. at 3231 (explaining how the majority rejected a categorical exclusion of business 
methods because it would be inconsistent with (1) the broad definition of “process” under 
35 U.S.C. §100(b), and (2) the passage of the First Inventor Defense Act); see supra notes 
85-86 (discussing prior user defense); see also Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228 (discussing how 
Congress would not have had to create a defense to business method patents if business 
methods were not patentable. 
 167. Id. at 3227-28.  Since Bilski, district courts have continued to apply the machine-or-
transformation text.  For a discussion of those cases, see Mark A. Lemley, Michael Risch, 
Ted Sichelman, & R. Polk Wagner, Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1319-22 
(2011) (discussing cases involving the machine-or-transformation test). 
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per se excluded from patentability under § 101.
168
  He considered § 101 
through an historical lens and concluded that business methods were not 
subject to patent protection in the past and should not be patentable 
today.
169
  In Justice Stevens’s view, the Founders and Congress intended 
patents to protect “useful” or “technological” arts – meaning inventions 
like ships, gunpowder, paper, and stone work – not methods of doing 
business.
170
  In sum, State Street was wrongly decided (or has been wrongly 
interpreted), and it was time to fix that mistake.
171
 
Unfortunately for the high tech and financial industries, Justice 
Stevens was unable to muster a majority for this across-the-board ban on 
business method patents.  In the wake of Bilski, the number of Class 705 
patents issued by the PTO grew rapidly,
172
 while lower courts continued to 
struggle with the subject matter eligibility of business methods.
173
  If there 
were any chance for meaningful change in the law, it would have to come 
from Congress.  Consequently, those seeking patent reform shifted their 
attention back to Capitol Hill. 
 
 168. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 169. Id. at 3246 (“By the early 20th century, it was widely understood that a series of 
steps for conducting business could not be patented.”). There appears to be evidence 
supporting both sides of the debate about the role business method patents have played 
historically.  See supra Part II.B.   
 170. Bilski, 130 S. Ct.  at 3243-44. 
 171. Id. at 3248 n.40.  Justice Stevens argued that State Street does not support the 
position that business methods are per se patentable because that case “dealt with whether a 
piece of software could be patented and addressed only claims directed at machines, not 
processes.”  Id. 
 172. Before Bilski, the PTO issued 1,177, 1,694, and 1,996 Class 705 patents in 2007, 
2008, and 2009, respectively.  Following Bilski the number of Class 705 patents increased to 
4,059, 4,064 and 4,854 between 2010 and 2012.  See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 
USPTO Patent Statistics, Patent Counts by Class by Year Report, available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cbcby.pdf (displaying patent statistics).   
 173. See, e.g., CLS Bank Int’l. v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 713F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(en banc).  In CLS Bank, the Federal Circuit granted en banc review to consider the subject 
matter eligibility of certain claims of various business method patents held by Alice 
Corporation.  Although a majority of the judges agreed that the claims were not patentable 
under § 101, the court issued a highly splintered decision with seven different opinions as to 
the rationale.  The patent owner recently filed a petition for certiorari arguing that the 
Federal Circuit is “irreconcilably fractured” on § 101 questions.  See Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari at 3, Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, No. 13-___ (U.S. Sept. 4, 2013) (asking whether 
computer implemented inventions are patentable subject matter).  On December 6, 2013, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and oral argument is scheduled for March 31, 2014.  See  
Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, SCOTUSBLOG, available at 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/alice-corporation-pty-ltd-v-cls-bank-
international/ (last accessed Dec. 19, 2013) (listing the filings and proceedings in the case).   
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IV. BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS AND THE AIA 
Several factors contributed to the call for patent reform that ultimately 
culminated in the passage of the America Invents Act in 2011.
174
  As the 
boundaries of patentability expanded,
175
 the number of patents issued by the 
PTO skyrocketed.
176
  Questions abounded about the legitimacy of many of 
these patents, particularly software and other business method patents.
177
  
Along with this upsurge in patents came a rise in litigation, with ten times 
more patent suits filed in U.S. federal courts in 2006 than in 1990.
178
  Yet, it 
was not just the quantity of litigation that spawned the reform movement; it 
was the quality too.  Many of these patent suits were brought by PAEs—or 
“trolls” as they are pejoratively called—which are companies that acquire 
and assert patents but do not practice their inventions.
179
  PAEs tend to 
litigate more aggressively than competitors because (1) there is no risk of 
inviting a counterclaim for infringement of a related patent (PAEs do not 
produce products), and (2) discovery is significantly less burdensome 
(PAEs do not generate many documents).
180
  Consequently, companies 
(particularly in the high tech and financial sectors) were repeatedly named 
as defendants in patent infringement suits or threatened with litigation if 
they did not agree to license the patents. 
To make matters worse for defendants, patent owners who litigated 
these suits to trial frequently won big verdicts and/or obtained injunctions.  
For example, when a PAE sued Research in Motion (“RIM”), the provider 
of the popular BlackBerry™ handheld device, the jury awarded the patent 
owner almost $54 million in damages and the court entered a permanent 
 
 174. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284-341 (2011) 
(codified as amended in scattered parts of 35 U.S.C.).  One important motivating force 
behind the AIA not discussed in this Article was the need for international harmonization of 
our patent laws. See Robert P. Merges, Priority and Novelty Under the AIA, 27 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1023, 1046 (2012). 
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 177. Mark Lemley, Doug Lichtman & Bhaven Sampat, What to Do About Bad Patents, 
REG., 10, 10-13 (Winter 2005).   
 178. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 107, at 127. 
 179. Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public 
Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (2012). 
 180. David H. Harper & Jason P. Bloom, Eastern District of Texas Issues New Model 
Order Regarding E-Discovery in Patent Cases, HAYNES & BOONE’S NEWSROOM (October 3, 
2012), http://www.haynesboone.com/new-model-order-e-discovery/ (noting the “large 
discovery asymmetries . . . such as when an [NPE], which typically has little ESI to 
produce, initiates an infringement suit against a larger company, which normally bears much 
greater expenses for e-discovery”).   
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injunction.
181
  When the decision was partially affirmed by the Federal 
Circuit, RIM ended up settling for over $600 million.
182
  Microsoft too was 
slapped with a number of huge verdicts in the mid-2000s, the largest 
totaling $1.52 billion.
183
  And PAEs like DataTreasury have collected close 
to half a billion dollars in licensing fees and damages from big banks and 
other financial institutions.
184
 
The convergence of these circumstances provided fertile ground for 
patent reform.  Microsoft, RIM, Google, and other major tech companies 
claimed the patent system was broken, and they called on Congress to fix 
it.
185
  The first patent reform bill was introduced during the 109
th
 Congress 
on June 8, 2005 by Representative Lamar Smith, then-Chairman of the 
House Judiciary Committee’s Intellectual Property Subcommittee.
186
  A 
similar bill was introduced in the Senate by Orrin Hatch and Patrick Leahy 
in 2006.
187
  But both bills died in committee.
188
  It wasn’t until the 110th 
Congress, when the financial services industry took on a leadership role in 
patent reform, that legislative efforts began in earnest.
189
 
A. The Banks’ Role in Patent Reform 
Although the financial industry took some interest in the earliest 
patent reform efforts, it became a real priority in 2007.
190
  That year, bank 
lobbyists (particularly the Financial Services Roundtable) stepped up their 
 
 181. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 182. Rob Kelley, BlackBerry Maker, NTP Ink $612 Million Settlement, CNN MONEY 
(Mar. 3, 2006), http://money.cnn.com/2006/03/03/technology/rimm_ntp/.   
 183. See, e.g., Sinead Carew, Microsoft Hit With $1.52 Billion Patent Suit Damages, 
REUTERS (Feb. 23, 2007), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/02/23/us-microsoft-verdict-
idUSWEN465120070223.   
 184. See supra notes 136-140 and accompanying text (discussing DataTreasury’s 
litigation campaign against the finance industry). 
 185. See Tom Krazit, RIM Calls for Patent Reform in Newspaper Ad, CNET (Mar. 14, 
2006), http://news.cnet.com/RIM-calls-for-patent-reform-in-newspaper-ad/2100-1047_3-
6049699.html (discussing RIM’s use of newspaper ads to raise public support to change 
current patent policies); McCullagh, supra note 7; Hannibal Travis, The Future According 
to Google:  Technology Policy from the Standpoint of America’s Fastest-Growing 
Technology Company, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 209, 218-19 (2009) (discussing Google’s view 
that software patents threatened innovation).   
 186. Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act:  Part I of 
II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 435, 438 (2011-12) [hereinafter “Matal Part I”]. 
 187. Id. at 439. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id.; Lisa Lerer, Finance Industry Leads on Patent Reform, POLITICO.COM (July 31, 
2007), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0707/5187.html.  
 190. Id.; Patent Law Reform:  Injunctions and Damages:  Hearing before the Subcomm. 
on Intellectual Property of the Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, (109th Cong. June 14, 
2005) (Prepared Statement of Jonathan Band on behalf of Visa U.S.A. and the Financial 
Services Roundtable). 
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efforts with Congress, and it paid off.
191
  In April 2007, parallel patent 
reform bills were introduced in both houses of Congress.
192
  The bills 
included a number of provisions that aren’t directly relevant to this Article, 
most notably an adoption of a “first-to-file” rather than a “first-to-invent” 
priority system.  Yet, several features of the bills were intended to address 
the problems of patent quality, including a post-grant review proceeding 
that would allow patents to be challenged at the PTO rather than in 
expensive and prolonged litigation.
193
 
The high tech and financial sectors applauded the proposed legislation 
and encouraged Congress to move forward with the reform effort.
194
  But 
there were powerful dissenting voices too, especially from the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries.
195
  Dissenters argued that the 
new laws would weaken the patent system and hamper innovation.
196
  This 
schism forced Congress back to the drawing board to modify or eliminate 
the bills’ most controversial provisions.
197
 
The Senate continued its work on patent reform during the 111th 
Congress (2009-10), but it would take until September 2011 for the AIA to 
finally pass.  During that time, the banks’ lobbyists continued to pressure 
Congress.
198
  At a hearing before the House Subcommittee on Intellectual 
Property, for example, a representative of the Financial Services 
Roundtable stated: 
[G]iven the importance of the financial services sector to the 
[n]ation’s economy and infrastructure, it’s important that the 
patent system work for everyone, and currently, it does not.  So 
 
 191. The American Bankers Association and Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association also lobbied on the banks’ behalf.  Lerer, supra note 189, at 1. 
 192. Matal Part I, supra note 186, at 439. 
 193. Id.; Stephen T. Schreiner & Karen Axt, Why Banks are Now Implementing Patent 
Programs and How Patent Legislative Reforms Will Affect Banks, 124 BANKING L.J. 724, 
730 (2007) (noting the banks’ support for post-grant review of patents).  
 194. Press Release, Coalition for Patent Fairness Supports Introduction of Bipartisan, 
Bicameral Patent Reform Bills (Apr. 18, 2007), available at 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news- 
releases/coalition-for-patent-fairness-supports-introduction-of-bipartisan-bicameral-patent-
reform-bills-58578362.html.  The Coalition for Patent Fairness is a diverse group of 
companies supporting patent reform that included, among others, Apple, Intel, Microsoft, 
Visa, and the Financial Services Roundtable back in 2007.  Id. 
 195. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN 
SOLVE IT 101 (2009). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Matal Part I, supra note 186, at 441-42.   
 198. Letter from the Coalition of Patent Fairness to The Honorable Harry Reid, Majority 
Leader, U.S. Senate, and The Honorable Mitch McConnell, Republican Leader, U.S. Senate, 
Jan. 22, 2008, http://www.sifma.org/regulatory/comment_letters/61653310.pdf.  Signatories 
to the letter included Bank of America, Citigroup, JP Morgan, Wells Fargo, and many other 
financial institutions.  Id.  
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instead, the confluence of inoperability, forum shopping, and a 
lack of quality prior art, particularly in the area of business 
method patents, has conspired to leave financial firms, from the 
smallest community banks or local credit union or insurance 
agent to the largest global company, mired in . . . meritless 
litigation over patents of dubious quality.
199
 
Moreover, citing Lerner’s studies, the banks claimed that reform is 
particularly critical for the financial industry because financial patents are 
27 times more likely to be asserted in litigation than non-financial 
patents.
200
 
In March 2011, the banks got what they wanted.  The Senate adopted 
an amendment to the reform bill, including a provision sponsored by 
Senators Schumer and Kyl that established a new post-issuance review 
procedure exclusively for financial business method patents.
201
  This 
provision, which ultimately became section 18 of the AIA, has proven quite 
controversial. 
B. Section 18 of the AIA and Covered Business Method Patents 
Section 18 of the AIA establishes an administrative post-grant review 
proceeding for “covered business method” or “CBM” patents, meaning 
patents related to financial products.
202
  According to the legislative history, 
this proceeding will “offer a relatively cheap alternative to civil litigation 
for challenging these patents,” and will ease the burden on federal courts 
“dealing with the backwash of invalid business-method patents.”
203
  When 
considered alone this provision seems perfectly reasonable.  Therefore, to 
 
 199. America Invents Act:  Hearing on H.R. 1249 Before the H. Subcomm. on 
Intellectual Prop., Competition, & the Internet of the H Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th 
Cong. 3 (2011) (Statement of Steve Bartlett for the Financial Services Roundtable).   
 200. Schreiner & Axt, supra note 193, at 732 (summarizing the testimony of Tony 
Squires of Goldman Sachs). 
 201. Matal Part I, supra note 186, at 445; Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History 
of the America Invents Act:  Part II of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 626-642 (2012) [hereinafter 
“Matal Part II”].   
 202. Specifically, the Act defines “covered business method patent” as “a patent that 
claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other 
operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or 
service, except that the term does not include patents for technological inventions.”  35 
U.S.C. § 321.  The legislative history reveals the direct connection between this provision of 
the Act and the banking industry.  The legislative history explains that covered business 
method patents are intended to encompass patents “claiming activities that are financial in 
nature, incidental to financial activity or complementary to a financial activity.”  157 Cong. 
Rec. S5432 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Schumer).  This language, i.e., 
“financial in nature” etc., is derived from the provisions of federal banking statutes which 
limit banks’ activities to those that are “financial in nature” etc.  See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k). 
 203. 157 CONG. REC. S1367 (Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
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understand the controversy surrounding section 18, it is necessary to look 
at the other post-grant review proceedings created by the AIA. 
In addition to CBM, Congress created two other new administrative 
proceedings for challenging patents at the PTO: Inter Partes Review 
(“IPR”) and Post-Grant Review (“PGR”).
204
  With few exceptions, IPR 
allows any patent to be challenged at any time after issuance.
205
  But IPR is 
limited in scope in that a petitioner may only raise questions of novelty and 
non-obviousness based on patents and printed publications.
206
  PGR, on the 
other hand, is broad in scope, as it allows challenges on any ground 
“relating to the invalidity of the patent,” including prior use and § 101 
subject matter eligibility.
207
  However, PGR is available only for patents 
filed under the first-to-file system and, even as to those patents, the window 
to initiate a PGR remains open just for nine months after issuance.
208
  Thus, 
while these proceedings will no doubt prove useful, each has significant 
constraints that may impede effectiveness. 
Yet, there are far fewer constraints with respect to the CBM 
proceedings, leading some (including the former Chief Judge of the Federal 
Circuit) to conclude that section 18 is nothing more than a “bail out” for the 
banks.
209
  Specifically, section 18 permits parties accused of infringement 
to challenge any CBM (not just first-to-file patents as with PGR) on any 
validity ground (not just novelty and non-obviousness as with IPR).
210
  
Although section 18 was added to the Senate’s version of the reform bill 
 
 204. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311, 321 (2011). 
 205. IPR may only be initiated within twelve months of being served with an 
infringement complaint, and parties who have filed declaratory judgment actions are barred 
from seeking IPR.  35 U.S.C. § 315.  
 206. Id. § 312. 
 207. Id. § 321; Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron 
Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1993 (2013). 
 208. 35 U.S.C. § 321. 
 209. The Honorable Paul Michel, Rein in the Big Bank Bail-Out, PATENTLY-O (July 7, 
2011), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/07/guest-post-rein-in-the-big-bank-bail-
out.html; Sterne, supra note 140, at 45 (“Section 18 is widely considered to be a ‘bailout’ to 
the financial sector”); 157 CONG. REC. S5408 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (statement of Sen. 
Cantwell) (condemning section 18 as an “earmark rifleshot” for the banks); see also 
Financial Services Group Criticizes Foley & Lardner Attorney Over Patent Reform Issue, 
THE BLT: THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (July 21, 2011), 
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2011/07/financial-services-group-criticizes-foley-lardner-
attorney-over-patent-reform-issue.html (discussing banks’ criticism of a law firm when one 
of its members distributed an email repeating Judge Michel’s criticism of Section 18).   
 210. 35 U.S.C. § 321.  While section 18 currently includes an 8-year sunset provision, 
id., legislation has been proposed to eliminate it.  See S. 866 (May 6, 2013 113th Cong.); 
Tony Dutra, Schumer Seeks Permanent, Expanded CBM PTAB Challenges on Any 
Management Patent, BLOOMBERG BNA (May 7, 2013), available at 
http://www.bna.com/schumer-seeks-permanent-n17179873837/.   
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with little discussion, it was a hotly debated topic in the House.
211
  To be 
sure, Representative Shock offered an amendment striking section 18 from 
the bill as an earmark for the banks.
212
  Those who supported Shock’s 
amendment, like Representative Waters, believed section 18 would permit 
banks “to steal legally issued and valid patents.”
213
  Proponents of section 
18 responded that the new law would benefit a cross-section of the business 
community, not just financial institutions.
214
  In the end, Shock’s 
amendment was voted down 262-158,
215
 and section 18 became law when 
the AIA was passed by Congress and signed by President Obama on 
September 16, 2011.
216
 
C. Post-AIA Reactions to Section 18 
The financial industry presumably was pleased with the inclusion of 
section 18 in the AIA.  With all the lobbying efforts and money spent, it 
seemed a huge coup for the banks.
217
  Yet, in the first year after section 18 
became effective on September 16, 2012, only about 50 CBM petitions 
were filed, as compared to more than 500 IPR petitions filed during the 
same time period.
218
  More to the point, remarkably few proceedings were 
initiated by financial institutions.  Instead, most of the early section 18 
proceedings were brought by a diverse group of petitioners ranging from 
Apple and Google to LinkedIn and Liberty Mutual Insurance.
219
 
 
 211. Matal II, supra note 201, at 628-30.  More members participated in the debate on 
the CBM proceeding than any other provision of the bill.  Id. at 629. 
 212. 157 CONG. REC. H4496 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Shock). 
 213. Id. at H4496 (statement of Rep. Waters). 
 214. Id. at H4496 (statement of Rep. Grimm) (including McDonald’s, Wal-Mart, Costco, 
Home Depot, Best Buy, and Lowes among the companies that would benefit from § 18). 
 215. Id. at H4503.   
 216. 35 U.S.C. § 321. 
 217. See Lerer, supra note 189, at 1 (stating that banks spent at least $20 million 
lobbying for patent reform).  But see Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Political 
Economy of the Patent System, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1341, 1382 (2009) (finding that the 
pharmaceutical, manufacturing, and high tech industries spent more on lobbying for patent 
reform than the banks).   
 218. See Scott A. McKeown, Where are all the Business Method Patent Challenges?, 
Patents-Post Grant (Apr. 24, 2013), 
http://www.patentspostgrant.com/lang/en/2013/04/where-are-all-the-business-method-
patent-challenges.  Notably, the PTO’s cumulative statistics indicate that 522 IPR 
proceedings and 56 CBM proceedings were filed between September 16, 2012 and 
September 27, 2013.  See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, AIA Statistics (Oct. 30, 2013), 
available at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/statistics.jsp.  As indicated in 
Appendix A, however, we have identified 50 CBM proceedings during that timeframe 
involving different patents, so it’s unclear how the PTO is recording this data.   
 219. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, AIA Statistics, available at 
https://ptabtrials.uspto.gov/prweb/PRWebLDAP2/HcI5xOSeX_yQRYZAnTXXCg%5B%5
B*/!STANDARD?UserIdentifier=searchuser (last visited Dec. 2, 2013).   
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That trend appears to be changing, however.  As demonstrated in the 
chart at Appendix A, sixty-three new CBM petitions were filed between 
October 1, 2013 and February 21, 2014.  If filings continue at this rate, 
approximately four times as many CBM petitions will be filed in fiscal year 
2014 (189) as were filed in fiscal year 2013 (44).  And it is not only the 
overall number of CBM petitions that is increasing, but the number of 
financial institutions utilizing these proceedings appears to be on the rise as 
well.
220
  There are potential explanations for this shift in the data.
221
  
Perhaps in the immediate wake of the AIA fewer patent owners asserted 
their business method patents for fear of inviting section 18 challenges.  
Another possibility is that petitioners initially chose IPR over section 18 
proceedings out of concern that the challenged patents would not fall 
within the definition of “covered business method.”
222
  Indeed, early 
questions swirled about the proper interpretation of CBM.  Although the 
PTO issued a rulemaking in August 2012 stating that CBM would be 
interpreted broadly so as to include non-financial business method 
patents,
223
 that interpretation quickly became the subject of a lawsuit.
224
  
This uncertainty regarding the scope of section 18 may explain petitioners’ 
initial reluctance to use the new procedure. 
Some recent developments appear to have allayed these concerns, 
however, leading to a dramatic increase in the number of CBM petitions 
filed in the first two months of the current fiscal year.  First, in June 2013, 
the White House made various recommendations for improving our patent 
system, including expansion of the CBM program “to include a broader 
category of computer-enabled patents . . . .”
225
  Second, in August 2013, the 
 
 220. See Appendix A (demonstrating that Bank of America, PNC Bank, US Bancorp, 
and Fidelity have all filed  filedCBM petitions  in the current fiscal year).   
 221. This data was collected from the USPTO’s PRPS Filing System, 
https://ptabtrials.uspto.gov/prweb/PRServlet/oO9O9iMscyJc_fy6LnBDXO9xEtRpDxfL3At
36r8Aw8k%5B*/!STANDARD?.  In six instances, matters involving the same parties and 
patents are listed as two separate cases by the PTO (CBM2012-00002 and CBM2012-
00004; CBM2012-00010 and CBM2012-00011; CBM2013-00001 and CBM2013-00002; 
CBM2013-00003 and CBM2013-00004; CBM2013-00019 and CBM2013-00020; 
CBM2013-00021 and CBM2013-00023); CBM2014-00060, CBM2014-00066, and 
CBM2014-00067).  We have deleted duplicates for simplicity’s sake. 
 222. Susan Decker, SAP Wins Ruling on Versata Patent in $345 Million Case, 
BLOOMBERG (June 12, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-12/sap-wins-
ruling-on-versata-patent-in-345-million-case.html (“People had a misapprehension of how 
narrow the definition of covered business method patents is . . . False.”“).  Between 
September 2012 and May 2013, a total of 260 IPRs have been initiated.  See U.S. Patent & 
Trademark Office, AIA Statistics (May 31, 2013), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/statistics.jsp 
 223. 37 C.F.R. § 42.301. 
 224. Versata Dev. Grp. Inc. v. Rea, No. 1:13-cv-328(GBL/IDD), 2013 WL 4014649, at 
*1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 7, 2013). 
 225. Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: White House Task Force on High-
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federal lawsuit challenging the PTO’s interpretation of CBM was dismissed 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
226
  Finally, as discussed further 
below, Congress has proposed multiple bills over the past several months 
that would expand the scope of section 18 beyond patents related to 
financial products and services.
227
 
At this point, it is still too early to draw any conclusions regarding the 
CBM program since the procedures have been in place for less than two 
years.  What we do know is that CBM, IPR, and PGR have the potential to 
profoundly impact our patent system going forward.  For example, last 
June the PTO issued its first CBM decision in SAP America, Inc. v. Versata 
Dev. Grp., Inc. in which the agency struck down all the challenged claims 
under section 101.
228
  This case is being closely watched not only as the 
PTO’s first decision in this area, but because it conflicts with a recent 
Federal Circuit decision holding that the patent is valid, infringed, and that 
the patent owner is entitled to over $300 million in damages.
229
  Although 
the Federal Circuit denied SAP’s motions for stay and rehearing and the 
Supreme Court recently denied its petition for certiorari,
230
 Versata has  
appealed the PTO’s decision,
231
 so this  may not be the last we have heard 
on this case.
232
  How the Federal Circuit will resolve this sort of 
inconsistency is impossible to predict, and eventually the Supreme Court 
may have to weigh in on this and other issues raised by the AIA.
233
 
 
Tech Patent Issues (June 4, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-high-tech-patent-issues. 
 226. Versata Dev. Grp. Inc., 2013 WL 4014649, at *1.  The patent owner did, however, 
file a notice of appeal to the Federal Circuit on December 2, 2013.  Notice of Appeal, 
Versata Dev. Grp. Inc., 2013 WL 4014649 (E.D. Va. Aug. 7, 2013) (No. 1:13-cv-
328(GBL/IDD)). 
 227. See infra note 234 and accompanying text (discussing the Patent Quality 
Improvement Act). 
 228. SAP America, Inc. v. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc., Case CBM2012-00001, Final Written 
Decision (PTA June 11, 2013), available at 
https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/sap_cbm_decision.pdf.   
 229. Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP America, Inc., 717 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir.  2013).  
 230. Id.; see SAP America, Inc. v. Versata Software, Inc., SCOTUSBLOG, available at 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/sap-america-inc-v-versata-software-inc/ (last 
accessed Feb. 26, 2014) (indicating that the Court denied certiorari on Feb. 21, 2014).   
 231. .  SAP Am., Inc. v. Versata Software, Inc., Brief in Opp., No. 13-716, at 13 (Dec. 
2013), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Versata-
Final.pdf.   
 232. Only time will tell whether the parties will settle in light of the Supreme Court’s 
denial of SAP’s certiorari petition or  whether the Federal Circuit will end up reviewing the 
PTO’s invalidity determination.  
 233. Compare In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 698 F.3d 1349, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (on petition 
for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc) (O’Malley, J., concurring in the denial of 
rehearing) (“[A] prior court decision in which a party has failed to prove a patent invalid 
does not bar the [. . .PTO] from subsequently reexamining that same patent.”), with In re 
Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“No 
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In the meantime, the last several months have witnessed a resurgence 
of patent reform efforts, including one related directly to section 18.  This 
past May, Senator Schumer introduced the Patent Quality Improvement 
Act (“PQIA”) which would (i) expand the definition of “covered business 
methods” so that section 18 is no longer limited to financial patents, and 
(ii) eliminate section 18’s sunset provision to make the program 
permanent.
234
  In July, Representative Issa introduced the Stopping the 
Offensive Use of Patents Act (“STOP Act”), which is nearly identical to 
the PQIA.
235
  Simply put, these two acts would subject all business method 
patents to PTO scrutiny, not just those related to financial products.  While 
these proposals may seem logical in theory, they are unlikely to gain 
momentum given the extreme pressure such an expanded program would 
place on the PTO’s already-stretched resources.  Moreover, recent 
opposition from a coalition that includes major players like IBM, 
Microsoft, and 3M makes expansion of the CBM program even more 
improbable.
236
  In fact, the patent reform bill passed by the House last 
December—the Innovation Act introduced by Representative Goodlatte—
originally expanded the CBM program,
237
 but was  amended to eliminate 
those provisions because of opposition from these powerful software 
companies.
238
 
Yet, some of the other current proposals appear to have substantial 
support from the banks and other industries.
239
  First, there has been a lot of 
 
authority, no theory, no law or history, permits administrative nullification of a final judicial 
decision . . . . Judicial rulings are not advisory; they are obligatory.”).   
 234. S. 866 (May 6, 2013 113th Cong.).  The proposed bill defines “covered business 
method patent” to include a patent that “claims a method or corresponding apparatus for 
performing data processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or 
management of any enterprise, product, or service, except technological inventions.”  S. 866 
– Patent Quality Improvement Act of 2013, CONGRESS.GOV, 
http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th/senate-bill/866 (last visited Dec. 20, 2013). 
 235. Stopping the Offensive Use of Patents Act, H.R. 2766, 113th Cong. (2013).  
 236. Letter to Chairmen Leahy and Goodlatte re: Patent Reform (Sept. 19, 2013), 
available at http://www.chi.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Cross-Sector-Letter-
Addressing-Concerns-with-Proposals-to-Expand-PTO-%E2%80%9CCovered-Business-
Method-Patents%E2%80%9D-Program-Sept.-19-2013.pdf.   
 237. Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 238. Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 3309, Offered by Mr. Goodlatte of 
Virgina, Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013).  Of course, only time will tell what 
will happen in Congress, as Schumer and others still strongly support expansion of the CBM 
program.  See Timothy B. Lee, Software Patent Reform Just Died in the House, Thanks to 
IBM and Microsoft, WASH. POST. (Nov. 20, 2013, 10:17 AM) 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/11/20/software-patent-reform-
just-died-in-the-house-thanks-to-ibm-and-microsoft/ (quoting Schumer as saying that he 
expects the CBM provisions to remain in the Senate legislation even though they were 
removed from the House bill). 
 239. Letter to Majority Leader Reid, Minority Leader McConnell, Speaker Boehner, and 
Minority Leader Pelosi re: Patent Reform (July 17, 2013), available at 
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discussion recently, including in the popular media,
240
 about using attorney 
fee awards and/or sanctions to ward off patent trolls.
241
  Second, limitations 
on discovery in patent cases have already been implemented in a number of 
courts,
242
 and there are legislative proposals to codify these discovery 
restrictions to curb patent litigation abuse.
243
  And finally, both Congress 
and the Executive Branch have taken on the “who owns what patent” 
problem,
244
 which refers to the widespread practice of failing to disclose 
patent transfers and other ownership information to the public.
245
  
Sometimes patent owners set up shell companies to hide the identity of the 
real party in interest, while other patent owners simply fail to inform the 
PTO when the patent changes hands.
246
  Either way, anonymous patents can 
create real problems when it comes to managing, licensing, and litigating 
 
http://www.patentfairness.org/media/press/#2013-07-17-1 [hereinafter July 17 Letter] 
(signatories include the American Bankers Association, the Financial Services Roundtable, 
and the Independent Community Bankers of America); Tony Dutra, Obama Anti-Patent 
Troll Announcement Hists a Nerve in U.S. Business Community, BNA’S PATENT, 
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., Vol. 86, No. 2117, at 281 (June 7, 2013) (stating that the 
American Bankers Association has been active in the current patent reform debate). 
 240. See, e.g., Randall R. Rader, Colleen V. Chien & David Hricik, Make Patent Trolls 
Pay in Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/make-patent-trolls-pay-in-court.html?_r=0 
(explaining the problematic behavior of patent trolls and the legal tools that should be used 
to combat this behavior).  
 241. See, e.g., Innovation Act (H.R. 3309) (providing that the prevailing party in a patent 
suit should usually be awarded attorneys’ fees and other costs); Patent Abuse Reduction Act 
of 2013 (S. 1013) (awarding attorney’s fees in patent cases to the prevailing party except in 
certain cases); Patent Litigation Integrity Act of 2013 (S. 1612) (same).  
 242. See, e.g., The Honorable Leonard Davis, In the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Texas General Order 12-6, (Feb. 27, 2012) (adopting a new model order 
to limit discovery in patent cases); DCG Sys., Inc. v. Checkpoint Techs., LLC, No. 5:11-cv-
03792-PSG, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (adopting a version of the “Model Order on E-Discovery 
in Patent Cases” that limits the scope of electronic  discovery). 
 243. See, e.g., Patent Litigation and Innovation Act (H.R. 2639) (staying discovery in 
patent cases until certain motions are resolved); Patent Abuse Reduction Act, supra note 
241 (limiting the scope of discovery, sequencing discovery, and imposing cost shifting for 
the discovery of “non-core” documentary evidence). 
 244. Colleen V. Chien, The Who Owns What Problem in Patent Law (Jan. 30, 2012), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1995664 [hereinafter Chien, Who Owns What]. 
 245. See, e.g., End Anonymous Patents Act, H.R. 2024 (requiring names of patent 
owners and real parties in interest to be disclosed to PTO); Patent Abuse Reduction Act of 
2013, S. 1013 (proposing that patent complaints must include “the identity of any person 
with a direct financial interest in the outcome of the action”); The White House Task Force 
on High-Tech Patent Issues, Legislative Priorities & Executive Actions (June 4, 2013) 
(requiring patentees and applicants to disclose the “real party-in-interest” to the PTO).  
More recently, the PTO put out for notice and comment rules requiring patent applicants 
and owners to regularly update ownership information.  See Attributable Ownership, 
USPTO, last visited Feb. 26, 2014, available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init_events/attributable_ownership.jsp.    
 246. See Chien, Who Owns What, supra note 244, at 3-4. 
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patents. 
Whatever the outcome of these various reform efforts, the message 
has been consistent: our patent system remains broken.  Nevertheless, the 
number of patent applications filed and patents issued by the PTO 
continues to rise each year, even for business method patents.
247
  The fact is 
that many of the same financial firms that pled with Congress to fix 
business method patents are building their own patent portfolios.  
Questions about what the banks are patenting and why it matters are 
explored next. 
V. THE PATENT PORTFOLIOS OF BIG BANKS 
In the current environment, it is commonplace for financial 
institutions of all sizes to own patents.  For purposes of this Article, 
however, we focused our research on large financial institutions for several 
reasons.  First, to the extent that the patent process involves a significant 
investment of resources, one would expect that larger institutions would be 
more likely to have significant patent activity.
248
  Second, large institutions 
are often industry leaders.  Therefore, if there has been a change in attitude 
toward the benefits of patents in the financial services industry, one might 
expect to see a change in larger financial institutions before smaller ones.
249
  
Finally, and most generally, the political and economic power of large 
financial institutions means that their interest in patents may have a 
significant impact on patent practice and policy.
250
 
 
 247. In 2012, there were 542,815 utility patent applications filed compared to 503,582 in 
2011 and 490,226 in 2010.  As for patent grants, the total for utility patents was 253,155 in 
2012 compared to 224,505 in 2011 and 219,614 in 2010.  U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 
U.S. Patent Statistics, Calendar Years 1963-2012, available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.pdf.  In 2012, 4,854 class 705 
patents were granted compared to 4,064 in 2011 and 4,059 in 2010.  See U.S. Patent & 
Trademark Office, U.S. Patent Statistics, Patent Counts by Class by Year, available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cbcby.pdf.   
 248. Innovation, in general, is expensive.  Early studies by Peter Tufano estimated that 
the costs of developing a new financial product range from $50,000 to $5 million.  Peter 
Tufano, Financial Innovation and First-Mover Advantages, 25 J. OF FIN. ECON. 213, 213-40 
(1989). 
 249. Consistent with this observation, Tufano found that the large financial institutions 
were the primary innovators.  Id. at 219.  Outside of financial services, larger firms spend 
more on research and development than smaller ones.  Michael Mandel, Scale and 
Innovation in Today’s Economy, PROGRESSIVE POLICY INSTITUTE POLICY MEMO (December 
2011) at 3–4, available at http://progressivepolicy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/12/12.2011-Mandel_Scale-and-Innovation-in-Todays-Economy.pdf.  
Whether that means more generally that larger firms innovate more than smaller firms is not 
as clear.  Id. at 2. 
 250. Although our study focuses on big banks, we recognize the unique value that 
patents could provide to smaller financial institutions, especially in the effort to raise capital 
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Specifically, we examined the patent activity of U.S. banks that are 
global systemically important banks (“G-SIFIs”).  G-SIFIs are institutions 
that have been identified by the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”)
251
 as 
requiring special supervision because their size, complexity, and systemic 
interconnectedness make these institutions especially important to the 
world financial system and economy.
252
  While the patent activities of such 
institutions are not important to their supervision, we chose the G-SIFI 
status as a proxy for institutions with the most political and economic 
power.  Since November of 2011, the FSB has identified, annually, the 
banks that meet the G-SIFI criteria.  The following U.S. banks are included 
(in alphabetical order): Bank of America (“BOA”); Bank of New York 
Mellon; Citigroup;
253
 Goldman Sachs; JP Morgan Chase (“JP Morgan”); 
Morgan Stanley;
254
 State Street; and Wells Fargo.  The discussion below 
focuses on the recent patent activity of those eight banks. 
A.  Patent Activity of Big Banks 
Companies acquire patents—or build patent portfolios—in different 
ways.  Companies patent their own inventions, meaning the company’s 
employees file patent applications for “on the job” inventions, and then 
assign any issued patents to the company as required by their employment 
 
and attract business.  See, e.g., Amelia S. Rinehart, Patents as Escalators, 14 VAND. J. ENT. 
& TECH. L. 81, 111 (2011) (arguing that patents are particularly important for start-up 
companies that need to raise capital, but lack other measurable values of success); Clarisa 
Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 653 (2002) (“Among venture capitalists, both 
the quantity and quality of patents have long been factors that are taken into consideration 
when deciding whether to invest in a company, particularly in its early stages.”). 
 251. “The FSB, originally the Financial Stability Forum, was established in 1999.  The 
FSB was established to coordinate at the international level the work of national financial 
authorities and international standard setting bodies and to develop and promote the 
implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory and other financial sector policies.  It 
brings together national authorities responsible for financial stability in significant 
international financial centres, international financial institutions, sector-specific 
international groupings of regulators and supervisors, and committees of central bank 
experts.”  
Overview, FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/overview.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2013). 
 252. Specifically, the FSB states: “SIFIs are financial institutions whose distress or 
disorderly failure, because of their size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would 
cause significant disruption to the wider financial system and economic activity.”  FSB, 
Policy Measures to Address Systemically Important Financial Institutions, 1 (Nov. 4, 2011), 
available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104bb.pdf.   
 253. In considering patent grants, Citigroup includes Citigroup, N.A., Citicorp 
Development Center, Inc., Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., and Citicorp Credit Services, Inc. 
 254. In considering patent grants, Morgan Stanley includes Morgan Stanley, Morgan 
Stanley Dean Witter & Co., and Morgan Stanley Capital International, Inc. 
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contracts.
255
  Information about these types of patent transactions is widely 
available because the PTO maintains records of the names of the inventors, 
as well as the names of the individuals or entities to whom ownership of 
the patent was assigned at the time the patent was issued.
256
 
Portfolios are also built by purchasing patent rights from other firms.  
Although patents have always been bought and sold, the practice has 
become ubiquitous in recent years.
257
  Some patent transfers have even 
garnered the attention of the mainstream media, such as Kodak’s 2012 sale 
of its portfolio to Apple, Google, Facebook, and others for $525 million.
258
  
Aside from the rare high-profile transaction, however, publicly available 
data about patent transfers is scarce.  Patent owners are not required to 
notify the PTO when patents change hands,
259
 nor are firms usually 
compelled to disclose their financial interests in patents.  As noted earlier, 
proposals to remedy this information deficit are currently on the table, but 
for the moment the “who owns what patent” problem persists.
260
  
Consequently, our ability to evaluate the patent activity of big banks suffers 
from these limitations.
261
 
Still, even given these constraints, the data tell an interesting story 
about patents and the financial industry—namely, that G-SIFIs have been 
patenting many of their own inventions in recent years.  Looking first at 
utility patents generally, the PTO has issued an annual report for almost 
two decades (1995-2012) that lists in descending order the organizations 
that received forty or more patents during a given calendar year.
262
  From 
1995 to 2007, none of the G-SIFIs appeared on this list.
263
  That trend 
began to shift in 2008 when JP Morgan was issued forty-seven patents; JP 
 
 255. See generally Merges, Menell & Lemley, supra note 42, at 86-87. 
 256. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Patent Full-Text and Image Database, 
Tips on Field Searching, available at 
http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/help/helpflds.htm#Assignee_Name.   
 257. See Chien, Who Owns What, supra note 244 at 2 (reporting that patent transfers 
have grown from less than 2,000 in 1980 to almost 90,000 by 2003). 
 258. See Andrew Martin, Kodak to Sell Digital Imaging Patents for $525 Million, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2012, at B3 (reporting on Kodak’s announcement of its sale of 1,100 digital 
imaging patents to a “consortium that includes many of the world’s biggest technology 
firms”). 
 259. Chien, Who Owns What, supra note 244, at 2-3. 
 260. See supra notes 244, 245 (discussing proposals to curb “anonymous patents”). 
 261. With regard to the activities of banks in particular, one might expect to see banks 
taking a security interest in patents as collateral for loans.  A security interest in a patent, 
however, is perfected through compliance with state law Uniform Commercial Code filing 
systems.  Security interests are not recorded with the PTO.  In re Cybernectic Servs., Inc., 
252 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2001).  
 262. The threshold number was thirty until 1998 when it was increased to forty.   
 263. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Reports By Patenting Organization, Final 
Tabulation - Patenting by Organizations Report, Single Year Reports, 1995 to Present, 
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/reports_topo.htm.   
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Morgan has remained on the list for the past four years with its highest 
number of patent grants (eighty-four) in 2010.
264
  The other G-SIFIs with 
substantial patenting activity include BOA, Morgan Stanley, and Goldman 
Sachs.  BOA received seventy-three patents in 2011 and 165 patents in 
2012, while Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs have each only appeared 
on the list once since 2008.
265
 
To understand the significance of these figures, it helps to put them in 
perspective.  In 2012, the two organizations issued the greatest number of 
patents were International Business Machines Corporation (“IBM”) and 
Samsung Electronics Co. (“Samsung”).  That year, IBM and Samsung 
received 6,457 and 5,043 patents, respectively, far outpacing the other 
leading patenting organizations.  Indeed, only twenty-six other entities 
were granted more than 1,000 patents in 2012, most of which are in the 
high tech sector.
266
  Thus, while the G-SIFIs’ total patents are low 
compared to the high tech giants, their numbers resemble those of firms in 
more traditional patenting industries.  In 2012, for example, the PTO issued 
BOA 165 patents, and issued a similar number to Stanford University 
(182), Advanced Micro Devices (178), and the U.S. Army (172).  
Likewise, when JP Morgan received eighty-four patents in 2010, it was not 
far behind entities with longstanding patent practices like Konica Minolta 
(87) and Whirlpool Corporation (86).
267
 
Perhaps even more telling about this surge in financial industry 
patenting are the data regarding Class 705 patents.  The PTO reports on the 
patents in certain technology classes with a breakdown by organization.  
The report for Class 705 provides patent count numbers from 1969 to 
2012.
268
  Before 2006, the only G-SIFI with any substantial Class 705 
patenting activity was Citigroup.
269
  That started to change in the mid-
2000s, however, as illustrated in the table below. 
 
 264. Id.  JP Morgan was issued forty-two, sixty, and seventy-three utility patents in 
2009, 2011, and 2012, respectively.  Id. 
 265. Id.  Morgan Stanley was issued forty-six utility patents in 2010 and Goldman Sachs 
was issued forty utility patents in 2012.  Id. 
 266. Id.  These companies include, inter alia, Sony, Panasonic, Microsoft, Google, and 
Apple. 
 267. Id.  Minolta and Whirlpool have appeared on the list consistently since 1995. 
 268. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Statistics, Class 705, Breakout by 
Organization, supra note 104, available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/tecasga/705_torg.htm.   
 269. From 1969-2005, the PTO issued Citibank and affiliated entities fifty-nine Class 
705 patents.  See supra note 247. During that same time period, the other G-SIFIs received a 
total of eight Class 705 patents broken down as follows: BOA (one); JP Morgan (one); 
Wells Fargo (zero); Goldman Sachs (four); State Street (zero); Morgan Stanley (two); Bank 
of NY Mellon (zero).  Id. 
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As the table reflects, all of the G-SIFIs except State Street have 
increased their Class 705 patenting over the past six years.  Of the 320 
firms listed in the Class 705 report, IBM was the organization granted the 
most patents between 1969 and 2012 with 1,402.  While none of the G-
SIFIs are in IBM’s league, some of them are real contenders in the world of 
business method patents.  JP Morgan has 238 Class 705 patents, ranking 
9th overall; BOA has 133 Class 705 patents, ranking 21st overall; and 
Goldman Sachs has 130 Class 705 patents ranking 22nd overall.
270
  This is 
particularly remarkable given that these three banks had so few Class 705 
patents before 2006.
271
  In other words, this rapid rise in the ranks is based 
exclusively on the banks’ patenting activity over the past six years. 
Moreover, most of the G-SIFIs have continued their patenting 
efforts even after the AIA.  The most extreme example is BOA, which has 
filed at least seventy Class 705 patent applications since September 2011.
272
  
But Goldman, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, and Wells Fargo have also 
pursued business method patents in the post-AIA era.
273
  We cannot 
 
 270. Morgan Stanley and Citigroup would have ranked higher if the patents owned by 
their affiliates were consolidated. 
 271. See supra note 265 (discussing G-SIFIs’ patenting activity before 2006). 
 272. We gathered this data from the PTO database on patent applications available here: 
http://appft1.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-adv.html.  The search terms used for BOA 
were [an/”Bank of America” and ccl/705/$; for Goldman [an/”Goldman Sachs” and 
ccl/705/$; for JP Morgan [an/”JP Morgan” and ccl/705/$; for Morgan Stanley [an/Stanley 
and ccl/705/$; and for Wells Fargo [an/”Wells Fargo” and ccl/705/$.  From this list, we 
identified those application filed after September 16, 2011—the date the AIA was enacted.  
Similar searches were run for Citigroup, NY Mellon, and State Street, but no Class 705 
post-AIA patent applications were found.   
 273. Id. 
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determine the exact number of pending patent applications submitted by 
banks because such information is not generally published until eighteen 
months after filing.
274
  But the fact that banks are continuing to patent at all 
raises questions about what the future holds.
275
 
B.  Character of Big Bank Patents 
Clearly, big banks are patenting more now than ever before, but the 
nature of those patents is difficult to measure.  We do not offer an empirical 
characterization of G-SIFIs’ patent holdings or activities.  Such a study is 
beyond the scope of this project.
276
  Instead, we offer some general 
observations regarding recent patent activity that may be worthy of future 
study.  As discussed in Part I, financial innovations can be categorized into 
the following groups: new products or services; new processes or 
procedures; and new organizations.
277
  The following discussion includes 
observations of big banks’ business method patents for each of those 
groups.
278
 
Not surprisingly, many Class 705 patents relate to traditional 
banking products and services, i.e., lending and deposit taking.  BOA holds 
patents for “evaluating customers’ ability to manage revolving credit”
279
 
 
 274. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
 275. See Vanessa Kortekaas, Financial Services Patents Hit Seven-Year Low, FINANCIAL 
TIMES (June 2, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/51fe3f9c-cb65-11e2-8ff3-
00144feab7de.html (stating that, although the number of financial patent applications is 
down, there were still 3,500 financial services patent applications filed worldwide in 2012).  
 276. Duffy and Squires studied 100 recent 705/35 patents.  Based on that data, Duffy and 
Squires offer two observations.  First, a significant number of patents in that group had little 
to do with finance.  Second, even among the patents that had a connection to finance “very 
few even purported to disclose the type of cutting edge financial engineering in valuation or 
product and market design that would be cognizable as a significant development in 
financial theory (with significance judged by the standards that would be applied in business 
schools or economics departments).”  Duffy & Squires, supra note 47, at 26. 
 277. As discussed in Part I, financial innovation can also be categorized according to 
function.  Both types of categorizations present difficulties in application in the context of 
reviewing patents.  We found that the new products/processes/organizations categorization 
presented relatively fewer difficulties. 
 278. These categories are overlapping.  For example, many new processes and 
procedures relate directly to new products.  Similarly, many new business structures offer 
new products.  See Tufano, supra note 22 at 4-5 (“The[se] ‘innovations’ are sometimes 
divided into product or process innovation . . . . . .[i]n practice, even this innocuous 
differentiation is not clear, as process and product innovation is often linked.”).  Despite this 
obvious overlap, we think these categories are a useful mechanism for organizing our 
discussion of big banks’ patents. 
 279. U.S. Patent No. 8,078,529 (filed May 28, 2009).  Revolving credit includes credit 
cards.  This patent involves the aggregation of certain types of spending behavior by 
customers utilizing revolving credit. 
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and an “automated teller machine transaction queue.”
280
  Wells Fargo holds 
a patent for a “system and method for MICR-based duplicate detection and 
management.”
281
  While many patents that relate to traditional banking 
activities do not, on their face, appear especially innovative, some do.  For 
example, BOA owns a patent for a process that measures the 
“physiological response of a customer during financial activity.”
282
  This 
innovation recognizes that while technological advances allow consumers 
to pay for their purchases with great ease, such convenience may lead to 
overspending or other undesirable financial transaction behavior.  This 
technology would, among other things, provide a customer with an alert if 
conditions were present (e.g., elevated heart rate) that would likely produce 
an unfavorable financial transaction.
283
 
Big banks’ Class 705 patents also include those relevant to modern, 
complex financial products.  Citibank, for instance, holds a patent for a 
“system and method for creating and managing a synthetic currency.”
284
  
Goldman Sachs owns a patent for a “system and method for creating, 
managing and trading hedge portfolios.”
285
  Bank of New York Mellon 
owns a patent for a “method and system for securitizing a currency related 
commodity.”
286
 
Big banks also hold patents relevant to new processes and 
procedures.  Several Class 705 patents relate to internal compliance or risk 
management.  In fact, we found a surprising number of big bank patents 
that included “risk management” in the title: twenty-one held by Goldman 
Sachs;
287
 two by BOA;
288
 and three by JP Morgan.
289
  Both Morgan Stanley 
 
 280. U.S. Patent No. 8,260,707 (filed July 15, 2008).  This patent covers a process by 
which a customer can initiate a banking transaction from a networked device, e.g., a 
personal computer.  The transaction is then stored and available for completion by the 
customer at an ATM location. 
 281. U.S. Patent No. 8,060,442 (filed Apr. 21, 2008).  MICR is an acronym for magnetic 
ink character recognition and refers to the string of characters printed at the bottom of a 
check.  This patent is for a process of detecting the presentation of duplicate checks. 
 282. U.S. Patent No. 8,417,584 (filed July 29, 2010). 
 283. Id. 
 284. U.S. Patent No. 6,188,993 (filed Apr. 11, 1997).  The patent description explains 
that “[s]ynthetic currency is created by pooling and dividing into shares a portfolio of highly 
liquid assets and frequent evaluation and disbursements of dividends on those assets so as to 
hold the value of the synthetic currency share at unity with the underlying currency.”  Id. 
 285. U.S. Patent No. 7,885,885 (filed Aug. 15, 2007).  This patent “discloses 
apparatuses, systems and methods for providing optimal hedge portfolios that minimize 
single stock idiosyncratic risk for a given level of transactional costs.”  Id. 
 286. U.S. Patent No. 8,332,292 (filed Sept. 28, 2005). 
 287. U.S Patent Nos. 8,311,933 (filed Oct. 19, 2011); 8,266,051 (filed Jan. 15, 2010); 
8,099,357 (filed Feb. 2, 2010); 8,086,617 (filed May 21, 2010); 8,285,615 (filed May 11, 
2009); 8,024,251 (filed Sept. 10, 2008); 7,711,637 (filed Feb. 7, 2007); 8,209,246 (filed 
June 18, 2003); 8,140,415 (filed Mar. 20, 2001); 8,126,800 (filed Mar. 15, 2004); 7,752,227 
(filed Mar. 15, 2004); 8,069,105 (filed June 17, 2003); 7,979,347 (filed Nov. 16, 2000); 
476 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 16:2 
 
and the Bank of New York Mellon hold patents involving VaR,
290
 the 
popular risk management tool discussed in Part I. 
Other big bank patents cover some of the newer business structures 
also discussed in Part I, such as Internet banks and special purpose 
vehicles.  Several big bank patents support Internet banking operations.
291
  
Both Bank of New York Mellon and JP Morgan own patents creating 
systems that rely on special purpose vehicles or similar structures.
292
  Given 
the attractiveness of banks to the sensibilities of wrongdoers, it is not 
surprising that banks hold patents related to fraud and crime prevention.
293
  
By way of example, BOA holds a patent for a “fraudulent transaction 
identification system”
294
 and one for a “method and system to evaluate anti-
money laundering risk.”
295
 
Finally, while our study is focused on business method patents, we 
note that banks also hold more conventional patents that have nothing to do 
with the business of banking in particular or business methods generally.  
BOA owns a patent for video game technology,
296
 several patents on a light 
fixture,
297
 and a patent on a golf ball.
298
  JP Morgan owns a patent for an 
“active night vision image intensity balancing system.”
299
  These non-
 
7,904,361 (filed June 18, 2003); 7,676,426 (filed June 19, 2003); 8,121,937 (filed July 24, 
2003); 7,548,883 (filed Aug. 1, 2003); 7,529,702 (filed Dec. 8, 2003); 7,181,428 (filed Jan. 
30, 2001); 7,024,383 (filed Mar. 16, 2000); 6,829,590 (filed Oct. 31, 2000). 
 288. U.S. Patent No. 7,630,934 (filed Feb. 20, 2008); 7,496,964 (filed Nov. 23, 2004). 
 289. U.S. Patent No. 8,311,922 (filed Oct. 13, 2010); 7,890,343 (filed Jan. 11, 2005); 
7,840,468 (filed Mar. 2, 2007). 
 290. U.S. Patent No. 8,234,201 (filed Mar. 20, 2009) (“system and method for 
determining a liquidity-adjusted value at risk (LA-Var)” held by Morgan Stanley); U.S. 
Patent No. 8,275,686 (filed July 24, 2008) (“methods for measuring hedging value-at-risk 
and profitability” held by Bank of New York Mellon). 
 291. U.S. Patent No. 8,458,070 (filed June 15, 2012) (held by JP Morgan Chase); U.S. 
Patent No. 7,971,059  (filed June 28, 2011) (held by Bank of America); U.S. Patent No. 
7,865,605 (filed June 16, 2008)  (held by Citibank). 
 292. U.S. Patent No. 8,326,720 (filed Aug. 4, 2012) (“systems and methods for 
securitizing a commodity” owned by Bank of New York Mellon); U.S. Patent No. 
8,374,938  (filed Mar. 26, 2010) (“system and method for managing hedging of longevity 
risk” owned by JP Morgan Chase); U.S. Patent No. 8,332,292 (filed Sept. 28, 2005) 
(“method and system for securitizing a currency related commodity” owned by Bank of 
New York Mellon). 
 293. According to the PTO, Jacob Perkins was granted the first patent in financial 
services for an invention for “Detecting Counterfeit Notes.” USPTO White Paper, supra 
note 57, at 2.  
 294. U.S. Patent No. 8,103,568 (filed Oct. 15, 2008). 
 295. U.S. Patent No. 8,412,601 (filed Sept. 30, 2004). 
 296. U.S. Patent No. 8,251,815 (filed June 19, 2008). 
 297. U.S. Design Patent Nos. D601,297 (filed May 6, 2009) and D601,296 (filed May 6, 
2009). 
 298. U.S. Patent No. 6,482,109 (filed Nov. 29, 2000).   
 299. U.S. Patent No. 7,646,884 (filed Jan. 12, 2008).  This patent relates to night vision 
system for a vehicle.  The Ford Motor Company is also an assignee on this patent. 
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financial patents raise interesting legal questions.  Under federal law, 
“financial holding compan[ies]”
300
 are permitted to engage only in activities 
that are “financial in nature or incidental to such financial activity” or, in 
some instances, activities that are “complementary to a financial 
activity.”
301
  All of the G-SIFIs are financial holding companies
302
 and are, 
therefore, subject to this activity restriction.  While we defer analysis of 
this question to future study, as an initial matter we find it hard to imagine 
that patenting a video game is “financial in nature,” “incidental to such 
financial activity,” or even “complementary to a financial activity.”
303
  Golf 
balls, on the other hand, are clearly essential to banking.
304
 
C.  Why Are Big Banks Patenting? 
Entities are motivated to patent their inventions for various 
reasons.  Some of the most common explanations are that patents help 
commercialize inventions, provide a return on investment, and prevent 
competitors from free-riding.
305
  Even while banks may be engaging in this 
traditional calculus, we consider additional explanations for the recent 
higher rates of patenting by big banks. 
An obvious explanation is that banks increased their patenting 
activity once State Street made clear that business methods were 
patentable.  If it were that simple, however, one would expect to see a 
significant rise in the number of Class 705 patents issued to G-SIFIs in the 
few years post-State Street, but this is not the case.
306
  Instead, the surge in 
bank patents did not materialize until a decade after the Federal Circuit 
decided State Street. 
Another possibility is that G-SIFIs started patenting defensively 
when others sued or threatened to sue for patent infringement.  The purpose 
of defensive patenting is three-fold: (1) to prevent others from patenting an 
 
 300. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(p) (2006). 
 301. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1); Saule T. Omarova, Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, 
Commerce and Commodities, 98 MINN. L.R. 1178 (2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2180647; Saule T. Omarova & M. Tahyar, That Which We Call a 
Bank: Revisiting the History of Bank Holding Company Regulation in the United States, 31 
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 113 (2011). 
 302. For a current list of all financial holding companies, see Bd. of Gov. of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys., Financial Holding Companies (Oct. 8, 2013), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/fhc.htm. 
 303. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1) (2006). 
 304. That BOA owns a patent on a golf ball is somewhat amusing.  In the traditional 3-6-
3 model of commercial banking, bankers paid 3% on deposits; charged 6% interest on loans; 
and were on the golf course by 3:00.  Over the last forty years, the 3-6-3 model has become 
less reality and more old joke.  See Schooner & Taylor, supra note 32, at 7-11.  
 305. Merges, Mennell & Lemley, supra note 42, at 125-34.   
 306. See USPTO Statistics, supra note 104.  
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invention; (2) to discourage patent suits with the threat of a counterclaim; 
and (3) to create prior art that can be used to invalidate asserted patents.
307
  
Ideally, defensive patents avoid litigation and force competitors to enter 
into cross-licenses since each party owns patents covering the others’ 
products.
308
  Of course, defensive patenting works best against competitors, 
as opposed to PAEs, because PAEs do not manufacture products and 
cannot be countersued for infringement.
309
  Perhaps this explains why the 
big banks have not sued each other for patent infringement, but instead 
have been targeted by PAEs.
310
 
Alternatively, the G-SIFIs may be patenting their inventions in 
order to sell those patent rights to others.  As discussed earlier, a substantial 
marketplace has developed for patents in recent years, so it is possible that 
banks are acquiring patents and then selling them to PAEs to enforce or 
exploit as they see fit.
311
  Unfortunately, little public information exists 
regarding these sorts of transactions.  Therefore, it is not possible to know 
for certain what banks are doing with their patents post issuance.  Yet, 
given how common this transfer practice has become in the high tech 
industry,
312
 it seems fair to speculate that banks are engaged in it as well. 
Banks could also be holding onto their patents and licensing them 
to practicing companies as a revenue source.  Many companies, IBM being 
a prime example, license (rather than practice) a substantial portion of their 
patent portfolios.
313
  Like patent transfers, however, the publicly available 
information regarding patent licenses is extremely limited.
314
  One way 
patent licenses come to light is through litigation, but so far big banks have 
not sought to enforce their patents in court.  That could change, however, 
as the patent landscape continues to evolve and banks build bigger and 
stronger patent arsenals. 
 
 307. Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent 
Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 299-301 
(2010) [hereinafter Chien, From Arms Race]  
 308. Id. at 307-10. 
 309. Id. 
 310. See id. (arguing that defensive patenting has reduced the number of competitor suits 
in the high tech arena); see also supra Part III (discussing  patent litigation against the 
banking industry). 
 311. Chien, From Arms Race, supra note 307, at 301.  
 312. Id. at 300-01. 
 313. See, e.g., Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, The History of Intellectual 
Property Taxation: Promoting Innovation and Other Intellectual Property Goals?, 64 SMU 
L. REV. 795, 848 (2011) (“Texas Instruments and IBM changed their core businesses, 
moved away from manufacturing products, and embraced a licensing model that allowed 
them to capitalize on their strengths based on powerful patent portfolios.”).  
 314. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. 
REV. 1991, 2021-23 (2007). 
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Finally, we do not doubt that some part of the increasing interest in 
patenting by big banks is a result of law firm marketing.
315
  Changes in law 
provide opportunities for lawyers to market their services.  Certainly, State 
Street and its progeny have given law firms the basis for selling patent 
expertise beyond the more typical client base of manufacturing, 
pharmaceutical, and biotechnology firms.  Many bank managers or even in-
house counsel may simply have not had patents on their radars in the past, 
but have responded favorably to the suggestion that patent protection be 
added to their repertoire for protecting intellectual property. 
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF BANK PARTICIPATION IN THE PATENT 
SYSTEM 
While the banking industry and the patent system have co-existed 
in this country for centuries,
316
 only recently have these two institutions 
begun to intersect.  In this final Part, we consider potential implications of 
big banks participating in our patent system, both as advocates for patent 
reform and as patent owners themselves. 
A. The Banks as Patent Reformers 
For almost a decade now, patent reform has been a hot topic on 
Capitol Hill.  During the initial phase of the patent reform effort, which 
began around 2005 and culminated in the passage of the AIA in 2011, the 
banks played a prominent role, despite being relative newcomers to the 
patent arena.
317
  The banks aligned themselves with high tech/software 
companies and together they lobbied Congress for various changes to the 
patent system—changes that, for the most part, would weaken patent 
owners’ rights vis à vis alleged infringers.
318
  Importantly, these 
 
 315. See, e.g., NovusIP, LLC Website, Financial Patents, available at 
http://www.novusip.com/Practice-Areas/Financial-Patents.shtml (last visited Nov. 20, 2013) 
(offering legal services related to patent protection); Chapman & Cutler LLP Website, 
Patent Procurement, available at http://www.chapman.com/practices-Patent-
Procurement.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2013) (offering legal services for the procurement 
and enforcement of patents).   
 316. See, e.g., Jerry W. Markham, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM 
CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS TO THE ROBBER BARONS (1492-1900) 88-89 (M.E. Sharpe Books 
88-89 2002) (discussing at length the development of the United States banking system 
while mentioning the existence of patents); Edward C. Walterscheid, Patents and 
Manufacturing in the Early Republic, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 855 (1998) 
(discussing the initial interpretations and purposes of the U.S. patent system). 
 317. See supra Part IV.A (recounting the banks’ evolving role in patent reform).  
 318. Id.; see also William C. Rooklidge, Reform of the Patent Laws: Forging Legislation 
Addressing Disparate Interests, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 9, 13-16 (2006) 
(discussing how proposals for limits on injunctive relief and damages could “alter the 
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recommendations were met with resistance from a separate powerful 
coalition consisting of pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms who 
advocated for a first-to-file system, elimination of the inequitable conduct 
defense, and other measures to protect patent owners.
319
 
Still, the banks emerged as clear winners in this first round of 
reform, securing broad rights to challenge financial patents at the PTO 
under section 18 of the AIA.
320
  When section 18 was first proposed, 
commentators pondered why banks should get such a “sweet deal,”
321
 and 
high-profile figures in the patent community, including the former Chief 
Judge of the Federal Circuit, called it a blatant “bail out” for a favored 
constituency.
322
  Despite the opposition and criticism, section 18 became 
law—a testament to the strength of the bank lobby.  Indeed, banks have 
been called the most powerful lobby in Congress today.
323
 
It is precisely because of this influence that we believe the banks’ 
participation in the current patent reform effort is worthy of close attention.  
As Kesan and Gallo have observed, “The design of a patent system, like 
any other formal institution, depends not only on objective technical or 
scientific characteristics that will promote optimal efficiency, but also on 
the political preferences of the economic actors with a stake in the matter to 
be regulated.”
324
  The most recent patent reform measures,
325
 which are 
primarily aimed at curbing PAE or troll activity, are supported by the high 
tech and banking industries,
326
 as well as a number of retailers, restaurants, 
 
balance of rights between patent owners and accused infringers”).  
 319. Eric E. Williams, Patent Reform: The Pharmaceutical Industry Prescription for 
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 320. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the AIA and the big banks’ role in this legislative 
reform effort). 
 321. Janie Lorber, Patent Carve-Out Finds Opponents Left and Right, ROLL CALL (June 
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 322. Michel, supra note 16 (criticizing section 18 and arguing that Congress should 
remove it from the patent reform bill). 
 323. See, e.g., Interview by Ray Hanania with Richard Durbin, U.S. Senator, Ill., on 
Radio Chicagoland (WJJG 1530 AM radio broadcast Apr. 27, 2009), available at 
http://www.progressillinois.com/sites/progressillinois.com/files/durbin-banks.mp3 
(explaining that the bank lobby is the most powerful in Congress: “they frankly own the 
place.”). 
 324. Kesan & Gallo, supra note 217, at 1348. 
 325. See supra Part IV.C (summarizing the legislative, executive, and judicial patent 
reform proposals).  
 326. It is true that the high tech industry is not monolithic in its view on patent policy.  
See R. Allison, Abe Dunn & Ronald J. Mann, Software Patents, Incumbents and Entry, 85 
TEX. L. REV. 1579, 1621 (2007) (stating that the software industry has diverse perspectives 
on patent policy).  Indeed, as discussed earlier, several leading software companies like IBM 
and Microsoft opposed the expansion of the § 18 CBM program, while others (like Google) 
supported it.  Yet a substantial number of the industry players support the remaining reform 
efforts, which are directed primarily at patent trolls.  See About the Coalition, COALITION 
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grocery stores, and other small business groups.
327
  What may be absent 
from this wave of reform, however, is the formidable counter-voice that the 
pharmaceutical and biotech industries provided Congress during the last 
reform effort.  Because PAEs don’t usually target and sue pharmaceutical 
companies, that industry is less interested in the present debate.
328
 This 
leaves the door open for banks to take on greater significance in shaping 
patent law.
329
 
This possibility of increased bank involvement in the patent system 
should cause pause.  Just a few years ago, big banks had virtually no stake 
in the patent system, while the manufacturing and pharmaceutical 
industries have decades of experience in this area.
330
  Moreover, even 
though banks have begun to patent their inventions more, skepticism 
remains about the efficacy of patents with respect to financial innovation.
331
 
This skepticism should come as no surprise in light of some 
fundamental differences between technological innovation, on the one 
hand, and financial innovation, on the other.
332
  Pharmaceutical innovation 
 
FOR PATENT FAIRNESS, http://www.patentfairness.org/learn/about/ (last visited Oct. 17, 
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Release, Independent Community Bankers of America (Nov. 21, 2013), available at 
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Innovation Act and suggesting additional reforms to the patent system). 
 330. See Schreiner & Axt, supra note 193, at 725-26 (explaining that banks did not 
worry about patents before State Street and believed patents were limited to “hard 
technology”). 
 331. Fusco, Patentability of Financial Methods, supra note 27, at 16-23. 
 332. There is some indication that financial innovation may be heading in a more 
technical direction, as compared to more traditional financial innovation, which consists 
primarily of business methods and systems.  See, e.g., Kortekaas, supra note 275 (discussing 
technology-based financial innovations, including Barclay’s smartphone apps to enable 
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is a useful example.  Pharmaceutical products are developed over an 
extended period of time during which they are tested, challenged, and 
replicated before introduction to the market.
333
  While some 
pharmaceuticals are fabulously successful, many fail, so the industry relies 
on patents to recoup development costs.
334
  Financial innovation, by 
contrast, occurs very quickly with little experimentation or external 
scrutiny.
335
  Consequently, banks and other financial innovators tend not to 
value patents as highly as inventors of more traditional technologies. 
In the end, the big banks are nascent players in the patent system 
whose experience with and contextualization of this complex landscape are 
far too limited to effectively advocate for well-balanced patent policy.  Yet, 
because of their powerful lobbying force, the banks are poised to exert 
disproportionate influence over our patent system in the years to come. 
B. The Banks as Patent Owners 
Most of the country’s largest banks have increased their patent 
holdings in recent years, probably as a defensive response to actual and 
threatened infringement suits.  Whatever the initial reason for pursuing 
patent protection, the end result is that several G-SIFIs now own substantial 
patent portfolios.  What does this mean for our patent system, specifically, 
and our society, more generally?  What potential implications should we 
consider going forward as our financial industry and patent system become 
further intertwined? 
1. Litigation Implications 
More patents generally translate to more lawsuits,
336
 so an increase 
in litigation surrounding financial business method patents is a distinct 
possibility.  It might seem ironic that defensive patents—which are 
 
customers to make faster payments). 
 333. See Melissa F. Wasserman, The PTO’s Asymmetric Incentives: Pressure to Expand 
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Bauerle, Technology, Law & Banking, 125 BANKING L.J. 563, 570 (2008) (explaining that 
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supposed to facilitate “patent peace”—actually increase litigation, but that 
is precisely what happened in the high tech sector.
337
  In the past fifteen or 
so years, high tech companies have stockpiled patents to protect themselves 
against litigation.
338
  Over time, companies have come to realize they no 
longer need all these unused patents—either because litigation threats from 
competitors have dissipated or because defensive patents are ineffective 
against PAEs.  These unused patents are sold to PAEs “who can make 
better use of them,” namely by asserting them against other practicing 
companies.
339
  Bank patents may follow a similar trajectory. 
Or perhaps the G-SIFIs will attempt to profit by enforcing their 
patents themselves.  There are a few different ways the banks might 
accomplish this.  First, as noted above, the banks could enforce their 
patents through licensing campaigns.
340
  Other companies, including 
financial services firms like American Express, have successfully exploited 
their once defensive patent portfolios this way.
341
  Second, banks could 
create intellectual property subsidiaries to sue non-competitors for patent 
infringement.
342
  Finally, the banks could start suing each other.
343
  Before 
the Smartphone wars, Apple primarily used its patents for defensive 
purposes and was generally viewed as a target of patent litigation.
344
  But 
that all changed when Apple sued Samsung, Motorola, HTC, and others for 
patent infringement over its smartphone and tablet technology.
345
  Although 
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the litigation is ongoing, Apple has enjoyed some great successes so far, 
including a $1.05 billion jury verdict in 2012 in its suit against Samsung.
346
  
Although the judge reduced the verdict by $405 million, on retrial the jury 
awarded $290 million, so Apple still recovered more than $900 million in 
damages.
347
 
Litigation can certainly be profitable for patent owners, yet there 
are serious costs as well.  Patent litigation has always been risky and 
unpredictable, but that may be even truer going forward as patents are 
subjected to post-grant review, discovery in patent cases is severely 
limited, and district courts exercise wider latitude with respect to attorney’s 
fees.
348
  Moreover, patent litigation detracts firms from their core business, 
diverts resources, jeopardizes important business relationships with 
competitors, and potentially impedes long-term growth.
349
  This is 
especially problematic for small companies for whom patent litigation is 
often cost prohibitive.
350
  In short, excessive patenting and litigation can 
deter small firms from entry into a market, thereby stifling competition to 
the detriment of consumers.
351
 
The costs of patent litigation are further complicated in the context 
of the business of banking.  As discussed in Part V.B., the activities of 
financial holding companies (which include all the G-SIFIs) are limited to 
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those that are “financial in nature.”
352
  The full explanation for such 
limitation is complex and beyond the scope of this Article.  However, one 
of the less discussed justifications for limiting the activities of banks is to 
ensure that banks provide an impartial and efficient source of credit without 
the prospect of distraction from that task by unrelated or conflicting 
activities.
353
  From this view, banks are seen as something like a public 
utility in that they provide a necessary public service and in return receive 
government support through, among other programs, deposit insurance.
354
  
One might conclude that banks’ involvement in patent litigation—
especially in cases in which the patented invention is unrelated to their core 
operations—is an undesirable distraction from the business of banking.  On 
the other hand, if patent litigation by big banks centers on innovations that 
are important to the banking business, then big banks (who already 
maintain a competitive advantage by being deemed “too big to fail”) may 
gain even greater competitive advantage over smaller institutions that can 
afford neither the costs of litigation, nor the costs of licensing patented 
processes. 
2. Regulatory Implications 
To the extent that big banks are highly regulated entities, we also 
consider the possibility of regulatory implications associated with this 
increase in the big banks’ patent activities.  A search through the patents 
owned by large financial institutions turns up all of the high profile culprits 
of the recent Financial Crisis, e.g., securitizations, hedge funds, VaR, etc.  
We wonder whether increased reliance on the patent process for such 
innovations has benefits beyond those associated with the patent system.  
Perhaps the enhanced transparency associated with the patent process is 
valuable.  The filing of a patent application requires the inventor to fully 
describe the invention.
355
  The disclosure requirement provides 
transparency that is obviously missing when inventors rely on trade secrets 
to prevent appropriability.  While bank regulators and the new Office of 
Financial Research
356
 have the ability to probe financial institutions for 
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detailed information regarding their financial products even when such 
information is not available to the public, patents may still be useful to 
regulators because they “push information exchange from an informal basis 
to a more formal one.”
357
 
To highlight this point, consider what happens if a bank forgoes 
patent protection and relies on trade secrecy instead.  Trade secrets, unlike 
patents, can last forever.
358
  So unless the trade secret is reverse engineered 
or disclosed some other way by a third party, the bank could protect its 
invention indefinitely.  But even if a bank chooses to disseminate 
information regarding the innovation either directly (e.g., through press 
releases) or indirectly (e.g., through interactions with regulators, customers, 
or even competitors), the quality of that information may be low.  With a 
patent, on the other hand, formal disclosure is required in the patent 
application so the invention can be practiced by someone having ordinary 
skill in the art.
359
  The patent process may serve as an additional source of 
information to regulators interested in bank activities—especially those that 
the banks deem worthy of significant investment.  We also recognize the 
possibility that the information generated in the patent process might not be 
useful to regulators—either because it is irrelevant to regulatory goals or 
too stale to illuminate current practices. 
It may also be true that the patenting of certain innovations could 
be detrimental to effective bank regulation.  Consider, for example, the fact 
that big banks have shown interest in patenting risk management 
processes.
360
  As discussed in Part I, risk management has become an 
essential tool of bank regulation.  If any of these risk management 
innovations proves particularly effective, regulators may want to adopt 
such processes as part of best, or even required, practices for all banks, 
large and small.  If the process is patented and cannot be designed around, 
then the owners of such patents may balk at the suggestion of use by their 
competitors (or, at least, they will want to charge for it).  After all, the 
whole point of the innovation is that it gives a competitive advantage.  
Therefore, allowing for the patenting of such processes may prevent efforts 
to improve overall financial stability.  Admittedly this is conjecture, but 
 
established the Office of Financial Research (OFR) in recognition of the lack of financial 
data and sophisticated analysis of the financial system prior to the Financial Crisis.  The 
OFR supports the Financial Stability Oversight Council by providing information and 
analytical tools regarding future systemic threats.  12 U.S.C. § 5343 (2006). 
 357. Merges, supra note 40, at 23. 
 358. Merges, Mennell & Lemley, supra note 42, at 27. 
 359. See, e.g., ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 940-41 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (holding the patent in question invalid for lack of enablement). 
 360. See supra notes 287-289 and accompanying text (listing various patents held by 
financial institutions). 
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similar problems have arisen with standards essential patents in the high 
tech industry.
361
 
CONCLUSION 
The story of big banks and their business method patents may be in 
its first chapter.  This Article highlights some of the potential tensions 
created by the intersection of the financial industry and the patent system—
two vitally important institutions to our nation’s prosperity.  Big banks’ 
experience with our patent system is short-lived and their motivations for 
seeking patents are likely multifaceted.  If big banks continue to seek patent 
protection, engage in patent litigation, and lobby Congress for reform, the 
impact on the U.S. patent system could be significant.  Big banks have the 
political and economic power to impose change that spills well beyond the 
boundaries of financial innovation and the financial industry.  While it is 
too soon to tell what this merging of landscapes will mean for our financial 
system, innovation policy, or society more generally, we suggest that 
policymakers and stakeholders keep a close eye as this relationship 
continues to evolve. 
 
  
 
 361. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting 
Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889 (2002) (discussing the role of standard-setting 
organizations in the patent industry). 
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APPENDIX 
 
CASE 
NUMBER 
DATE 
FILED 
PATENT  PETITIONER  PATENT 
OWNER 
CBM2014-
00077 
2/21/14 7424438 Monster 
Worldwide, Inc. 
 
CBM2014-
00076 
2/19/14 8311945 US Bancorp  
CBM2014-
00075 
2/18/14 7827119 GTNX, Inc.  
CBM2014-
00074 
2/18/14 7752142 GTNX, Inc.  
CBM2014-
00073 
2/19/14 
 7761387 
 
GTNX, Inc.  
CBM2014-
00072 
2/18/14 7756794 GTNX, Inc.  
CBM2014-
00071 
2/18/14 
 6963826 
ComScore, Inc.  
CBM2014-
00070 
2/12/14 8374901 Monster 
Worldwide, Inc. 
 
CBM2014-
00069 
2/12/14 8374901 Indeed, Inc.  
CBM2014-
00068 
2/12/14 7424438 Indeed, Inc.  
CBM2014-
00064 
1/29/14 
 8161104  
Experian 
Marketing 
Solutions 
RPOST 
Int’l 
CBM2014-
00063 
1/28/14 8489420 CoreSource, Inc. Quality 
Healthcare 
Intermed.,  
CBM2014-
00062 
1/28/14 8036916 CoreSource, Inc. Quality 
Healthcare 
Intermed.,  
CBM2014-
00061 
1/28/14 7117165 Coupa Software, 
Inc. 
Ariba, Inc. 
CBM2014-
00060 
1/23/14 6857022 MotionPoint 
Corp. 
Trans 
Perfect 
Global, Inc. 
CBM2014-
00059 
1/8/14 7899704 Cardlytics, Inc. Tuition 
Fund LLC 
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CBM2014-
00058 
1/8/14 7653572 Cardlytics, Inc. Tuition 
Fund LLC 
CBM2014-
00057 
1/7/14 5910988 Jack Henry & 
Assocs. Inc. 
Data 
Treasury 
Corp. 
CBM2014-
00056 
1/7/14 
 6032137 
 
Jack Henry & 
Assocs. Inc. 
Data 
Treasury 
Corp. 
CBM2014-
00054 
12/23/13 7035914 Google, Inc. SimpleAir, 
Inc. 
CBM2014-
00053 
12/20/13 8468099 Hulu LLC Intertainer, 
Inc. 
CBM2014-
00052 
12/20/13 8479246 Hulu LLC Intertainer, 
Inc. 
CBM2014-
00051 
12/20/13 8165939 Stewart Title 
Guaranty Co. 
Segin 
Software 
LLC 
CBM2014-
00050 
12/19/13 8239451 American Express 
Co. 
Metasearch 
Sys. LLC 
CBM2014-
00049 
12/19/13 6237916 GTECH Corp. SHFL 
Enter. Inc. 
CBM2014-
00048 
12/19/13 6698759 GTECH Corp. SHFL 
Enter. Inc. 
CBM2014-
00047 
12/18/13 8266000 Ebay Inc. Advanced 
Auctions 
LLC 
CBM2014-
00044 
12/15/13 7899704 Edo Interactive, 
Inc. 
Tuition 
Fund LLC 
CBM2014-
00043 
12/15/13 7653572 Edo Interactive, 
Inc. 
Tuition 
Fund LLC 
CBM2014-
00042 
12/15/13 7499872 Edo Interactive, 
Inc. 
Tuition 
Fund LLC 
CBM2014-
00041 
11/22/13 6237095 PNC Bank, N.A. Maxim 
Integrated 
Products 
CBM2014-
00040 
11/22/13 6105013 PNC Bank, N.A. Maxim 
Integrated 
Products 
CBM2014-
00039 
11/22/13 5949880 PNC Bank, N.A. Maxim 
Integrated 
Products 
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CBM2014-
00038 
11/22/13 5940510 PNC Bank, N.A. Maxim 
Integrated 
Products 
CBM2014-
00037 
11/16/13 7693783 SecureBuy, LLC Cardinal 
Commerce 
Corp. 
CBM2014-
00036 
11/15/13 8140429 SecureBuy, LLC Cardinal 
Commerce 
Corp. 
CBM2014-
00035 
11/15/13 7051002 SecureBuy, LLC Cardinal 
Commerce 
Corp. 
CBM2014-
00034 
11/13/13 7596784 Rackspace 
Hosting, Inc. 
Clouding 
IP LLC 
CBM2014-
00033 
11/12/13 7260587 Bank of America, 
Nat’l Ass’n 
Intellectual 
Ventures II 
LLC 
CBM2014-
00032 
11/12/13 7757298 PNC Fin. Servs. 
Group, Inc. & 
PNC Bank 
Intellectual 
Ventures I 
LLC 
CBM2014-
00031 
11/12/13 6182894 PNC Fin. Servs. 
Group, Inc. & 
PNC Bank 
Intellectual 
Ventures II 
LLC 
CBM2014-
00030 
11/12/13 7603382 Bank of America, 
Nat’l Ass’n 
Intellectual 
Ventures I 
LLC 
CBM2014-
00029 
11/12/13 7664701 PNC Fin. Servs. 
Group, Inc. & 
PNC Bank 
Intellectual 
Ventures I 
LLC 
CBM2014-
00028 
11/12/13 8083137 Bank of America, 
Nat’l Ass’n 
Intellectual 
Ventures I 
LLC 
CBM2014-
00027 
11/9/13 5361201 REDFIN Corp. Corelogic 
Solutions 
CBM2014-
00026 
11/4/13 5576951 eBay Inc.  Landmark 
Techs., 
LLC 
CBM2014-
00025 
11/4/13 7010508 GSI Commerce 
Solutions, Inc. 
Landmark 
Techs., 
LLC 
CBM2014-
00024 
11/1/13 8402281 Voltage Security, 
Inc. 
Protegrity 
Corp. 
CBM2014- 10/25/13 5910988 Fidelity Nat’l Data 
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00021 Info. Servs., Inc. Treasury 
Corp. 
CBM2014-
00020 
10/25/13 6032137 Fidelity Nat’l 
Info. Servs., Inc. 
Data 
Treasury 
Corp. 
CBM2014-
00019 
10/22/13 7490091 American Express 
Co. 
Metasearch 
Sys. LLC 
CBM2014-
00018 
10/21/13 8037158 SAP America Pi-Net Int’l 
CBM2014-
00017 
10/16/13 8209389 Epsilon Data 
Mgmt. LLC 
RPOST 
Communic
ations Ltd. 
CBM2014-
00016 
10/15/13 6871325 Agilysys, Inc. Ameranth, 
Inc. 
CBM2014-
00015 
10/15/13 6384850 Agilysys, Inc. Ameranth, 
Inc. 
CBM2014-
00014 
10/15/13 8146077 Agilysys, Inc.  Ameranth, 
Inc. 
CBM2014-
00013 
10/15/13 6982733 Apple, Inc. Ameranth, 
Inc. 
CBM2014-
00012 
10/16/13 6625582 Regions Fin. 
Corp. 
Retirement 
Capital 
Access 
Mgmt. Co. 
CBM2014-
00010 
10/11/13 8224913 Experian 
Marketing 
Solutions, Inc. 
RPOST 
Communic
ations Ltd. 
CBM2014-
00008 
10/11/13 6950807 Westlake Fin. 
Servs. 
Credit 
Acceptance 
Corp. 
CBM2014-
00007 
10/11/13 5412730 Callidus Software 
Inc. 
TQB 
Developme
nt LLC 
CBM2014-
00006 
10/9/13 7203752 Google Inc. Unwired 
Planet LLC 
CBM2014-
00005 
10/8/13 7024205 Google Inc. Unwired 
Planet LLC 
CBM2014-
00004 
10/8/13 7463151 Google Inc.  Unwired 
Planet LLC 
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CBM2014-
00003 
10/4/13 5884272 Google Inc.  Inventor 
Holdings 
LLC 
CBM2014-
00002 
10/4/13 5884270 Google Inc. Inventor 
Holdings 
LLC 
CBM2014-
00001 
10/1/13 8326924 American Express 
Co. 
Metasearch 
Sys. LLC 
CBM2013-
00059 
9/16/13 5949880 Branch Banking 
& Trust Co. 
Maxim 
Integrated 
Products, 
Inc. 
CBM2013-
00058 
9/17/13 7840486 MasterCard Int’l 
Inc. 
John 
D’Agostino 
CBM2013-
00057 
9/17/13 8036988 MasterCard Int’l 
Inc. 
John 
D’Agostino 
CBM2013-
00056 
9/11/13 7970674 Trulia, Inc. Zillow, Inc. 
CBM2013-
00055 
9/4/13 8266015 GSI Commerce 
Solutions, Inc. 
Clear With 
Computers, 
LLC 
CBM2013-
00054 
8/30/13 7908304 Callidus Software, 
Inc. 
Versata 
Dev. Grp., 
Inc. 
CBM2013-
00053 
8/29/13 7958024 Callidus Software, 
Inc. 
Versata 
Dev. Grp., 
Inc. 
CBM2013-
00052 
8/28/13 7904326 Callidus Software, 
Inc. 
Versata 
Dev. Grp., 
Inc. 
CBM2013-
00051 
9/6/13 8266044 Int’l Securities 
Exch., LLC 
Chicago 
Board 
Options 
Exch., Inc. 
CBM2013-
00050 
9/6/13 7980457 Int’l Secs. Exch., 
LLC 
Chicago 
Board 
Options 
Exch., Inc. 
CBM2013-
00049 
9/6/13 7356498 Int’l Secs. Exch., 
LLC 
Chicago 
Board 
Options 
Exch., Inc. 
CBM2013- 8/21/13 5664110 eBay, Inc. Cronos 
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00048 Techs. 
LLC 
CBM2013-
00047 
8/19/13 RE04390
4 
David W. Gillman StoneEagle 
Servs., Inc. 
CBM2013-
00046 
8/16/13 8438055 Groupon, Inc. Blue 
Calypso, 
LLC 
CBM2013-
00044 
8/16/13 8452646 Groupon, Inc. Blue 
Calypso, 
LLC 
CBM2013-
00042 
8/16/13 5878400 SAP America, 
Inc. 
Versata 
Software, 
Inc. 
CBM2013-
00040 
8/2/13 5424944 Dell, Inc. Disposition 
Servs., 
LLC 
CBM2013-
00038 
7/29/13 8185408 Search America, 
Inc. 
TransUnio
n 
Intelligence
, LLC 
CBM2013-
00037 
7/29/13 7333937 Search America, 
Inc. 
TransUnio
n 
Intelligence
, LLC 
CBM2013-
00036 
7/16/13 7441196 Google, Inc. EMG 
Technolog
y, LLC 
CBM2013-
00035 
6/25/13 7664516 Groupon, Inc. Blue 
Calypso, 
Inc. 
CBM2013-
00034 
6/25/13 8457670 Groupon, Inc. Blue 
Calypso, 
LLC 
CBM2013-
00033 
6/25/13 8155679 Groupon, Inc. Blue 
Calypso, 
LLC 
CBM2013-
00032 
6/25/13 7792749 Fidelity Nat’l Info 
Servs., Inc. 
CheckFree 
Corp. 
CBM2013-
00031 
6/24/13 7996311 Fidelity Nat’l Info 
Servs., Inc. 
CheckFree 
Corp. 
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CBM2013-
00030 
6/24/13 7853524 Fidelity Nat’l Info 
Servs., Inc. 
CheckFree 
Corp. 
CBM2013-
00028 
6/24/13 7383223 Fidelity Nat’l Info 
Servs., Inc. 
CashEdge, 
Inc. 
CBM2013-
00027 
6/18/13 6418419 Chicago Merc. 
Exch., Inc. 
5th Market, 
Inc. 
CBM2013-
00026 
5/31/13 7298271 Google, Inc. Peter 
Sprogis 
CBM2013-
00025 
5/29/13 7856430 LinkedIn Corp. AvMarkets 
Inc. 
CBM2013-
00024 
5/24/13 8095413 salesforce.com, 
Inc. 
VirtualAgil
ity, Inc. 
CBM2013-
00021 
5/6/13 5966440 Apple Inc. SightSound 
Tech., LLC 
CBM2013-
00019 
5/6/13 5191573 Apple Inc. SightSound 
Tech., LLC 
CBM2013-
00018 
4/23/13 7426481 Volusion, Inc. Versata 
Dev. Grp., 
Inc. 
CBM2013-
00017 
4/23/13 6834282 Volusion, Inc. Versata 
Dev. Grp., 
Inc. 
CBM2013-
00016 
4/23/13 8346637 Harland Clarke 
Holdings Corp. 
EZShield, 
Inc. 
CBM2013-
00015 
4/2/13 5862223 Oracle Corp. Communit
y United 
IP, LLC 
CBM2013-
00014 
3/29/13 6625582 US Bancorp Retirement 
Capital 
Access 
Manageme
nt, LLC 
CBM2013-
00013 
3/22/13 8037158 SAP America, 
Inc. 
Pi-Net Int’l 
Inc. 
CBM2013-
00009 
11/20/12 8140358 Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co.  
Progressive 
Cas. Ins.  
CBM2013-
00008 
11/14/12 6438526 MeridianLink, 
Inc. 
DH 
Holdings  
LLC 
CBM2013-
00005 
10/15/12 7941357 Bloomberg Inc. Markets 
Alert Pty 
Ltd.  
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CBM2013-
00003 
10/15/12 8090598 Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co. 
Progressive 
Cas. Ins. 
Co.  
CBM2013-
00001 
10/3/12 7877269 Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co. 
Progressive 
Cas. Ins. 
Co. 
CBM2012-
00010 
9/29/12 7124088 Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co. 
Progressive 
Cas. Ins. 
Co. 
CBM2012-
00007 
9/19/12 5361201 Interthinx, Inc. CoreLogic 
Solutions, 
LLC  
CBM2012-
00005 
9/21/12 6675151 CRS Advanced 
Tech., Inc. 
Frontlines 
Techs., Inc. 
CBM2012-
00003 
9/16/12 8140358 Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co. 
Progressive 
Cas. Ins. 
Co.  
CBM2012-
00002 
9/16/12 6064970 Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co. 
Progressive 
Cas. Ins. 
Co. 
CBM2012-
00001 
9/16/12 6553350 SAP America, 
Inc. 
Versata 
Software, 
Inc. 
 
